The Relation Between Post-Earnings Announcement Drift and the Value Anomaly in the UK Stock Market by Pedro Jácome Henriques de Lancastre
  
The Relation Between Post-Earnings Announcement Drift 
and the Value Anomaly in the UK Stock Market 
 
By  
Pedro Jácome Henriques de Lancastre 
201400455@fep.up.pt 
 
 
Master Dissertation in Finance 
 
 
Supervised by:  
Professor: Júlio Fernando Seara Sequeira da Mota Lobão 
 
 
2017 
 
 
i 
 
Biographical Note: 
Pedro Lancastre was born and raised in Braga. Most of his life journey was made in his 
home town, whereas he studied a Bachelor Degree in International Business and then a 
Bachelor Degree in Management at University of Minho graduating in 2013.  
During his lifetime he had some training courses abroad and he practiced sports mainly 
football and tennis. He also does some volunteering work during his free time. 
In 2014, he enrolled at FEP to start his master degree in finance, in which he developed 
interest to follow career in this field. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
Abstract 
Two of the oldest common anomalies that occur in the financial market are the value 
anomaly and post-earnings announcement drift. Value anomaly consists in value stocks 
that outperform growth stocks by having greater profitability with the same level of risk, 
while post-earnings announcement drift consists in firms that report unexpected high 
earnings outperform firms that report unexpected poor earnings by having greater 
profitability with the same level of risk.  
Both anomalies are provoked by different reactions in the market. The PEAD is provoked 
by an underreaction and the value anomaly is caused by an overreaction as it concerns 
when new information arrives, which have been part of study over the years among 
experts. The aim of this study is to link both anomalies in the UK stock market, since 
there is a lack of study in this field. Moreover, this study has theoretical relevance by 
testing the efficiency market hypothesis to see if investors can beat the market and 
practical relevance in the perspective of the investors to see if they can create a profitable 
strategy taking advantage of the market anomalies. 
It has been found that based on book-to-market, earnings-to-price, cash-flow-to-price and 
sales growth classifications achieved a 29.84%, 36.6%, 45.52% and 25.72% annual 
average abnormal return respectively.  
This study in supporting with previous studies about anomalies in this market conclude 
that UK stock market challenge the efficiency market hypothesis. 
Key-words: Value anomaly, post-earnings announcement drift; market efficiency 
hypothesis; overreaction, underreaction 
JEL-Codes: G02, G14 
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Sumário 
Duas das mais comuns antigas anomalias que ocorrem no mercado financeiro são o valor 
da anomalia e o post-earnings announcement drift. Valor da anomalia consiste em ações 
de valor ultrapassarem em desempenho ao obter maiores rendibilidades do que as ações 
de crescimento para o mesmo nível de risco, enquanto post-earnings announcement drift 
consiste em empresas que apresentam inesperadamente maiores resultados obtêm melhor 
desempenho ao conseguir maiores rendibilidades para o mesmo nível de risco do que 
empresas que apresentam inesperadamente menores resultados. 
Ambas anomalias são provocadas por diferentes reacções no mercado. O PEAD é 
provocado pela sub-reacção e o valor da anomalia é o resultado de uma sobre-reacção no 
que diz respeito à chegada de nova informação, o que tem sido parte de estudo ao longo 
dos anos por especialistas. O objectivo deste estudo é ligar as duas anomalias no mercado 
do Reino Unido, uma vez que há uma falha de estudo neste tema para este mercado. Além 
do mais, este estudo tem relevância teórica ao testar a hipótese de eficiência de mercado 
para ver se os investidores conseguem bater o mercado e tem também relevância prática 
na perspetiva do investidor para saber se ele consegue criar estratégias lucráveis, tirando 
vantagens das anomalias de mercado. 
Foi encontrado com base nas classificações de book-to-market, earnings-to-price, cash-
flow-to-price e sales growth um retorno anormal médio anual de 29.84%, 36.6%, 45.52% 
e 25.72% respectivamente. 
Este estudo com base nos estudos anteriores sobre anomalias neste mercado conclui que 
o mercado de ações do Reino Unido desafia a hipótese de eficiência de mercado. 
Palavras-Chave: valor de anomalia, post-earnings announcement drift; hipótese de 
eficiência de mercado, sobre-reacção e sub-reacção 
JEL-Codes: G02, G14 
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1. Introduction 
There are several anomalies that occur in the financial markets, which have been created 
interest of study in the financial literature over the years and among them are the post-
earnings announcement drift and the value anomaly. Relevant literature found to cover 
the existence of these anomalies (e.g. Foster et al. (1984), Bernard and Thomas (1989), 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) and Liu et al. (2003)).  
Recently, Yan and Zhao (2011) were the first and the only to link value anomaly directed 
to the post-earnings announcement drift and analyse the relationship between the two 
anomalies by covering the US stock market over 24 years, starting from 1984 until 2008.  
Using calendar time portfolio formation and 1, 3, 6, 9, 12 months holding period and 
BHAR as return metric, they found that a trading strategy taking a long position in value 
stocks when both EARs and earnings surprise are positive and short position in glamour 
stocks when both are negative can generate 16.6% to 18% annual returns. 
To best of our knowledge since this theme is recent to link the two anomalies, there is a 
lack of investigation in this field for other countries in which we intend to fill the gap in 
the literature by linking the two anomalies as well fill emptiness of (in)efficiency research 
on the UK stock market. We will rely on the Yan and Zhao (2011) study as our guideline, 
since it is the only published study. This topic focuses on the relation between these two 
anomalies and it has theoretical and practical relevance. It has theoretical relevance 
because it has theoretical implication of the results by knowing if the markets are efficient, 
and by that we want to know if stock prices would fully reflect all available and relevant 
information at any given time. These anomalies question the validity of the efficiency of 
the markets, therefore the idea of testing the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is 
important because it says that all stocks trade at their fair value because they reflect all 
available information, so investors cannot beat the market. As for the practical relevance, 
it is important for the perspective of the investor to see if they are able to create profitable 
opportunities by taking advantage of the anomalies of the market by identifying 
undervalued securities expecting that in the future will increase to outperform the market. 
In this way, we intend to answer our research questions: Is there any relation between the 
two anomalies? If the relation remains constant or not?  
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Our sample expands from 2010Q1 until 2015Q3 because we want to analyse the recent 
years and the events that happened in the UK stock during this period of time to see if it 
had any impact on the stock market and for the investor decisions.    
Following the main author for this study, we intend to construct portfolios sorted into 
quintiles based on the proxy classification with subsamples that vary with the direction 
of the signs. The subsamples will be based on the earnings announcement abnormal 
returns and earnings surprise performing a total of six sub-samples. Moreover, we add 
two more subsamples based on the earnings abnormal return sign in order to have more 
strengthens statistical tests and robustness for the EAAR/ES samples. 
The results by linking the two anomalies for the UK stock market found some evidences 
that challenge the Efficiency Market Hypothesis, as well significant drifts and the 
presence of anomalies in the event-window and the post-event window. Moreover, we 
found that our results for the 3-day event window and post-event windows are more 
volatile for the value stocks than for the glamour stocks with the same level of risk 
creating more profitable opportunities for the former than the latter stocks. In additionally, 
the same applies for the robustness check when we study for the size effect, adding also 
a small firm effect.   
Besides this chapter, the study proceeds with the following chapters: chapter 2 literature 
review, chapter 3 is the methodology, chapter 4 we describe the data and descriptive 
statistics, chapter 5 portfolio results under the subsample signs condition for both 
anomalies and we finish with chapter 6 where it remarks for conclusion, limitations, 
further research and suggestions. 
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2. Literature Review 
In this chapter contains evidence of literature review of both anomalies and possible 
explanations. In this way, in section 2.1 we have post-earnings announcement drift, 
section 2.2 value anomaly and section 2.3 behavior factors of underreaction and 
overreaction. 
2.1 Post-Earnings Announcement Drift 
Post-Earnings Announcement Drift (PEAD) anomaly is an anomaly that occurs in the 
financial market when firms report unexpectedly high earnings outperform firms 
reporting poor earnings with the same level of risk. Ball and Brown (1968) were the first 
to establish the existence of this anomaly through recognizing that following earnings 
announcements, the estimated cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) continuously drifted 
up in relation to firms announcing good news and continuously drifted down in relation 
to firms announcing bad news (Bernard and Thomas, 1989). 
The evidence of PEAD was later supported by studies such as Jones and Litzenberger 
(1970) whereas in their investigation of quarterly earnings with a sample of stocks on the 
US market from 1962-1967 found violations of the semi-strong efficiency by the fact of 
the market not adjust instantaneously and correctly when new information arrives, instead 
of that it reacts slowly and the results differ from the market.   
Later, Foster et al. (1984) in their study on US stocks 1974-1981 observed a correlation 
between abnormal returns and the unexpected earnings, by making a connection with size 
of the firms. “The smaller the firm, the larger is the post-announcement cumulative 
abnormal return with the positive (negative) earnings portfolios having positive 
(negative) cumulative abnormal returns”. (p.598) 
Moreover, Bernard and Thomas (1989) examine stocks in the US market over the period 
1974-86 and found that a large amount of the drift that takes place in the first 60 days 
following the announcement of earnings occurs within the first 5 days following the 
announcement of earnings. They estimated for 240 days for post-announcement and 
create an event-time portfolio formation with a size-adjusted risk control over the 120 
days surrounding the earnings announcement date. In fact Bernard and Thomas (1989) 
established that the percentage of the drift that occurs within the first 5 days following 
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the announcement of earnings in relation to the drift that takes place in the first 60 days 
following the announcement of earnings is 13% for small firms, 18% for medium firms, 
and 20% for large firms. In their empirical result to measure the magnitude of the drift, 
they obtain a long position in the highest unexpected earnings decile and a short position 
in the lowest decile would have yielded an estimated abnormal return of approximately 
4.2% over the 60 days after the earnings announcement, or about 18% on an annualized 
basis. 
Bernard and Thomas (1989) explains that when the Earning based model is used it reflects 
an identified risk premium which lead to PEAD been identified and this is because one 
of the problems security model aims to alleviate is the risk adjustment problem of 
Earnings based model. 
Liu et al. (2003) show another study outside of US stock market. This study was made 
for the UK stock market to find evidence of PEAD. They found evidence of PEAD, 
confirm that this anomaly is not a specific market, but exists and persist in any stock 
market. Extracting a sample period from 1988 until 1998, using a calendar time portfolio 
formation and a 3, 6, 9, 12 months holding period with a three-factor model as risk 
control, they use an alternative earnings surprise measures based on “(i) the time-series 
of earnings; (ii) market prices; and (iii) analyst forecasts. Using each of the measures we 
find evidence of significant post-earnings-announcement drift, robust to alternative 
controls for risk and market microstructure effects (…) Our conclusion is that the UK 
stock market is inefficient with respect to publicly available corporate earnings 
information” (p.89). 
Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) with a sample from US stocks from 1987-2003, holding 
period of 4 quarters, using CAR as return metric, they obtained 5.21% PEAD return per 
quarter. Concluding that differences comparing the analyst forecast to time series may 
lead to mispricing.   
Considering information uncertainty Francis et al. (2007) related with PEAD for the US 
stock market between 1982-2001. With a calendar time portfolio formation and 6 months 
holding period, using monthly alpha return metric and three/four factor model risk 
control, they establish a connection whereas stocks where the investors have less 
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information and gain earnings with that create mutual initial reaction. Moreover, they 
found that idiosyncratic volatility predicts the profitability of PEAD. 
This phenomenon of PEAD can be explained by several hypotheses. Among them, the 
most widely accepted explanation for this effect is that investors underreact to earnings 
announcements, and this anomaly does not adjust as quickly as it should (Daniel et al., 
1998; Hong and Stein, 1999). Moreover, it is also widely believed that there is a strong 
connection between earnings momentum and price momentum (Chordia and Shivakumar, 
2006) .  
Supporting the momentum evidence on the stock market Chan et al. (1996) found that it 
is possible with earnings momentum strategy may benefit from underreaction to 
information on short-term earnings, while a price momentum strategy may benefit from 
the slow reaction of the market to response the arrival of the information, including the 
long-term profitability. 
In additionally, several studies such as Sadka (2006) also showed that the liquidity risk 
could be one of the reasons of the earnings momentum as the Post-Earnings 
Announcement Effect appears to be strong in small cap stocks. 
Another two main reasons have also been part of discussion as a cause of PEAD supported 
in the literature by authors such as Bernard and Thomas (1989) and Ball et al. (1988). 
One of the causes is the delay price in response to new information, most explained that 
traders do not use all available information or due to transaction and trading costs. The 
other cause is the misspecification of CAPM, this cause is not plausibly and it is most 
explained that this model to calculated abnormal returns is unfinished or wrongly 
estimated.  
Many theories have been suggested and stated for reasons of this phenomenon since the 
first study of PEAD appointing for different arguments, but no consensus has been 
reached among the experts.  
2.2 Value Anomaly 
The Value Anomaly is one of the oldest anomalies of the markets and it consists to be the 
tendency of the value stocks outperforming growth stocks with the same level of risk. 
Graham and Dodd (1934) were the first to establish the concept of value anomaly by 
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recognizing the importance of paying a low price for stocks and make a definition of these 
two types of stocks (value and growth) in their study.  
The importance of paying low price for stocks came because value stocks systematically 
outperform growth stocks with the same level of risk. Although, smaller stocks are more 
difficult to value because they are riskier; have less information; more difficult to profit 
from that and have higher transaction costs, investors when are optimistic are willing to 
pay a lot for smaller stocks. Indeed, in times of recession investors are willing to pay more 
for value stocks because they have a better performance than growth stocks, while growth 
stocks are stronger in periods of expansion (Chan and Lakonishok, 2004). 
If firms do not have a long historic about smaller stocks, it will affect the mood of the 
investors. The main explanations have to do with the sentiment. These stocks are also 
difficult to arbitrage because it is difficult to profit from that, once it has no derivatives.  
Value stocks are low profile securities that are traded at a lower price relative to its 
fundamentals. This kind of stocks are characterized to have low (price-to-earnings; price-
to-book; price-to-cash flow; dividends) and others measures of their fundamentals in 
relation to the market average (Fama and French, 1992; Fama and French, 1996). These 
stocks are considered to be part of investors that use contrarian strategies, once according 
to Fama and French (1992) they are fundamentally riskier. So, investors consider them to 
be underpriced and because of that they can produce superior returns in compensation for 
the risk. 
The successful of this investment strategy is because they are contrarian to “naïve” 
strategies. These naïve strategies results from the lack of sense of the investor in reading 
the price market signs making an overreact or underreact in the process of the information. 
While, the contrarian investors bet against naïve investors because they invest in 
underpriced stocks and not in overpriced stocks by that outperforming the market (De 
Bondt and Thaler, 1985; Conrad, 1995).  
Additionally, the value strategy with the value investment philosophy supported by 
Graham and Dodd (1934) as stated before contrary the efficient market hypothesis that 
says that the market incorporates all relevant information, making it impossible to profit 
from undervalued stocks. 
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On the other hand, glamour stocks are shares in a company whose their earnings and sales 
are growing faster than those in other companies and are expected to continue to growth. 
According to Bourguignon and de Jong (2003) this type of investment style requires to 
investors a longer time-horizon by looking companies in booming industries for the 
expectation of rapid growing earnings and sales. In this sense, this contradicts the value 
stocks whereas the investor uses their strategy in short-horizon expecting to achieve gains 
from price momentum. 
From Lakonishok et al. (1994) study they found that one of the reasons why value stocks 
outperform growth stock is because investors overestimated future growth rates of 
glamour stocks relative to value stocks. They use sample of US stocks from the period 
1968-1990, with a calendar time portfolio formation and with 12 months holding period, 
they used B/M; E/P; C/P and GS ratios as proxies to capture value anomaly. The results 
present a 10%-11% value anomaly per year with a long positive position and a short 
negative position. 
In their study, they documented “value strategies” linking their higher returns to 
“overreaction hypothesis”. This happens because although, the evidence of mean 
reversion on growth forecast these strategies are contrarian investors and are able to 
exploit the naïve investors behavior or because they are riskier.   
A challenge to the EMH is the individual’s reaction to news. The most valuable 
commodity that we can have is information and with that people tend to overreact or 
underreact. However, some investors could in turn take advantage of people’s reaction 
which create a market anomaly and use their expertise to take advantage by profiting with 
that. On the other hand, the overreaction and underreaction could be consistent with the 
efficiency market hypothesis if both split randomly (Fama 1998).  
Investors overweight to new information because that newly information is salient and 
captures their attention, so it becomes important for them and have a heavy weight in 
terms of making decision resulting in overreaction whereas prices are pushed beyond the 
levels warranted by fundamentals. 
On the other hand, investors that underweight the arrival of new information cause 
underreaction. In this sense, it is possible to affirm that there is a lack of incorporation of 
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new information into stock prices such as earnings announcement and this underreaction 
continue until prices fully incorporate all information available. 
Despite the evidence of overreaction and underreaction Fama (1998) says that both are 
equally common. This is not supported with the previous studies when both phenomena 
act in different time horizons. 
However, this view is not consistent with Lee and Swaminathan (2000) showing that past 
trading volume provides an important link between “momentum” and “value” strategies, 
whereas these findings support the intermediate-horizon “underreaction” and the long-
horizon “overreaction” effects. 
The value anomaly is considered to be inconsistent with the CAPM model, once the value 
stocks tend to have higher expected returns than CAPM, while the growth stocks tend to 
have lower expected returns in comparison to the CAPM prediction.   
2.3 Behavioral factors for Overreaction and Underreaction  
The behavior of investors is related as an explanation of both reactions, as this factor is 
attributed as the cause of investors having overconfidence and biased self-attribution; 
representative heuristic; and to have bounded rationality concerning their overreaction to 
new information, while they are considered to have conservatism and bounded rationality 
concerning their underreaction to new information.  
2.3.1 Overconfidence and biased self-attribution 
Daniel et al. (1998) made a theory connecting the overconfidence to self-attribution bias, 
saying that this comes from the ability of the investors to think that they are smarter than 
the average and that they rarely make mistakes with their assumptions.  
According to the authors, the investors weights their private information comparing to 
public signals. Depending on the confirmation or not of the signals is what makes them 
to overreact or underreact. Normally, their overconfidence makes them overreact due 
private information, they trade with the information that they have even is irrelevant to 
gain with that and only adjust slowly when public signals contradict it.  
So, people are overconfident and that explains the excess volatility of asset prices because 
people overweight the information that they own. 
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The overconfidence and self-attribution also cause the continuing overreaction implying 
momentum in prices in the short-term, but the momentum is reversed when public 
information correct prices back to their fundamentals. So, stock prices are more volatile 
than fundamentals. Thus, these factors are also mean reversion in the long-term. 
2.3.2 Representativeness heuristic 
The representativeness heuristic was first theorized by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). 
This theory is used by people that take judgments and make decisions about the 
probabilities of an event under uncertainty. The authors of this theory argue that people 
rely on limited heuristic principles, reducing complex tasks of assessing likelihoods and 
predicting values to simple judgmental operation but sometimes they lead to severe and 
systematic errors. Nevertheless, the authors affirm that heuristics are useful because 
reduce our effort and time by simplifying our decision. 
In contradiction, Gigerenzer (1996) disagree with the theory developed by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974). He argues that this method explains everything and nothing at the 
same time, adding that the judgments and decisions should not take always be based in 
statistics and probabilities and it could be based made by asking questions of frequencies. 
Later, Barberis et al. (1998) present a model of investor sentiment stating with the 
representativeness people think they see actual earnings follow a random walk and the 
investors do not understand this, creating an overreaction because if they see growing 
earnings of a firm and due the random path of the earnings they might not continue to 
growth. Thus, it is created disappointment once they overweight and underweight the 
information and as consequence get contradictions results.  
2.3.3 Conservatism 
Basu (1997) find evidence of conservatism in result of earnings reflecting more quickly 
“bad news” than “good news”. 
Following that path, Barberis et al. (1998) based on the model previously stated, the 
investors are very stuck with their prior beliefs and for that they are slow to make 
adjustments of the underweight information and that contributes for the underreaction to 
new information. 
10 
 
These implications may lead to investors makes mistakes and assume that the firm is 
mean-reverting. 
2.3.4 Bounded rationality  
Bounded rationality is one of main behavior explanation of the investors and takes as 
consequence the creation of the overreaction and underreaction. 
Hong and Stein (1999) defined two groups of boundedly rational agents: “news watchers” 
and “momentum traders”. The “news watchers” do not pay attention to prices, only to 
news and the “momentum traders” only look at past prices. So, both are risk averse 
because do not evaluate a part of the information available. 
The news watchers adjust prices slowly only to new information, so there is only 
underreaction resulting in a combination of gradual information diffusion with the 
assumptions.  
On the other hand, momentum traders want to profit from the underreaction caused by 
news watchers and they use simple strategies by looking only to past prices, so they are 
pushing the price of winners above their intrinsic value creating overreaction to any news. 
Their model generates underreaction and price momentum in the short-term and 
overreaction and mean reversion in the long-term.  
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3. Methodology  
In this chapter, it is described the methodology used for study. The first subsection 
presents the overall framework for this study, second and third subsections present the 
choice of models and formulas to apply for the study and test statistics, the fourth 
subsection explain the tests statistics and finally the fifth and the sixth section explain the 
proxies and subsamples used for this study.   
3.1 Event Study 
From the literature review chapter, it was possible to conclude that post-earnings 
announcement drift and value anomaly violates the semi-strong form efficiency market 
hypothesis. So, in this sense it is important to introduce an event study approach to test 
the performance of the capital markets. The underlying assumption of this approach is 
that capital markets is semi-strong form efficiency. For that, it is necessary to measure 
the valuations effects of the earnings announcements as well as examine the response of 
the stock price around the earnings announcement of the event by treating and process 
the data in MS Excel and ESM software. 
The event study framework has not changed drastically since the late 1960’s when Ball 
and Brown (1968) and mainly when Fama et al. (1969) introduced their methodology 
concerning the estimation of abnormal returns (AR) as important measure to test the 
market’s efficiency in response to stock split announcements. Moreover, Fama (1991) 
states that event studies are an important part of finance and says that:  
“Event studies are the cleanest evidence we have on efficiency” (Fama, 1991, p. 1602). 
An event study more specifically, show the analysis and evidence of the impact of news 
and events related directly or indirectly to the company, its stocks as well as the industry, 
sector or overall market and any capture of the abnormal returns may result a detection 
of markets’ inefficiency. If markets are informationally efficient, then the event should 
reflect immediately on the announcement date and not on the following trading days. That 
is why event studies are often considered to test the efficiency of the market.  
There are short (< 1 year) and long-horizon (> 1 year up to 5 years) event studies. The 
short-horizon event studies are more reliable than the long-horizon event studies. 
Although the long-horizon event studies have been improved in last years, Kothari and 
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Warner (1997) say that these event studies still involve many issues and there is still a 
path to improve.  
In order to construct an event study, it is necessary to design an event study timeline. In 
this sense, following the standard event study technique by Brown and Warner (1985) 
there are three important periods to define. Firstly, the estimation window, also as known 
as the control period, whereas estimate the market model which is used to determine the 
normal behavior of a stock’s return in comparison with the market or industry index and 
it is normally used the regression model to determine this “normal” behavior. Secondly, 
the event window whereas it often starts a few trading days before the actual event day 
happen and length it is usually centered on the announcement. Based on actual returns 
during the event window and the “normal returns” predicted, “abnormal returns” are 
calculated for all days with the event window. This period of the timeline along with the 
abnormal returns are important to examine if whether the event announcement was 
anticipated, leaked or if the “post-announcement effect” needed more time to absorb the 
information content of the event and another reason is if the material of the event was 
relevant for the content in cause. 
Finally, we have the post-event window which is considered when a company makes an 
announcement or when an event significant occurs that makes impact on the market and 
this also allow us to measure the long-term impact of the event. Normally, the post-event 
window is associated to investigate the performance of the company following 
announcements when a major acquisition or an IPO happens.  
For this event study the firms of the market extracted from the United Kingdom will be 
used the quarterly earnings announcement. Additionally, this study focuses on 23 quarters 
from 2010Q1 to 2015Q3 and for the firms that announce earnings during the trading day, 
the event date will be the date of the announce and if the firms announce after the closing 
bell the event date will on the following day. Moreover, Jones and Litzenberger (1970), 
Foster et al. (1984), Bernard and Thomas (1989) and Yan and Zhao (2011) confirm the 
importance of collecting quarterly data as well the earnings surprise factor to exploit the 
post-announcement security return results. Since, the aim is to investigate the post-event 
window where possible post-announcement drift can occur and as we know the drift is 
commonly seen within 3-months after the earnings announcement.  
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The estimation window should be chosen in a way that the returns are not compromised 
with their performance with the event. Armitage (1995) suggest that the estimate period 
should range from 100 to 300 days. But, MacKinlay (1997) says that for the most common 
model, the market model, for the measure of normal returns it should be implemented an 
estimation window with a size of 120 days. We decided to follow Mackinlay (1997) and 
use the 120 days, since it also belongs to the period range purposed by Armitage (1995).  
As it concerns to the event window will be similar to Yan and Zhao (2011), it will be 
looked the drift starting from the second day after the current quarter´s earnings 
announcement and ends on the second day prior to the next quarter´s earnings 
announcement. The same approach of the author will happen for the post-event window 
in examine drift patterns in each sub-sample in the subsequent periods, starting from the 
second day after the earnings announcement up to 1 month (22 trading days), 3 months 
(63 trading days), 6 months (126 trading days), 9 months (189 trading days) and 1 year 
(252 trading days) after the earnings announcement.  
Thus, in this sense this should be long enough to calculate meaningful estimates of normal 
returns. Otherwise, a shorter sub-sample could affect the construction of expected returns. 
So, the choice of this event study as short-term is perfect to exclude any confounding 
effects and the sub-samples are long enough to capture any significant effect of the event. 
The timeline for event study is illustrated in figure 1  
Figure 1 - Timeline for event study 
             Estimation Window         Event Window  Post-Event Window 
 
T0              T1     T2           T3                                                       
  
    
-120              -1               0              1         22           63        126           189             252        
Source: Own Creation 
Time 
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3.2 Models for Measuring Normal Performance 
The event studies are used to measure the impact of a specific event on the value of firms 
or prices. That is why it is necessary to choose the appropriate normal return model. 
MacKinlay (1997) describe that there are two categories of models to be followed in order 
to estimate normal returns: statistical and economic. In additionally, he says that the 
former category follows from statistical assumptions concerning the behavior of asset 
returns and do not depend on economic arguments. On the other hand, the latter category 
relies on assumptions concerning on investors’ behavior and are not based only on 
statistical assumptions. However, it is needed to add statistical assumptions to put the 
economic model in practice. We followed the statistical model. 
3.2.1 Statistical models 
The right and the most popular model according to the financial literature for an event 
study determine that this thesis will rely on the Market Model in the calculation of the 
expected normal returns.  
The Market Model is probably the most common approach to construct expected returns. 
It is a more slightly sophisticated approach in which the return on a security depends on 
the return on the market portfolio of security’s receptiveness as measured by beta. In this 
sense, this model will overcome the impact of general market movements in a 
rudimentary way, once this model assumes a constant and linear relation between 
individual asset returns and the return of a market index. The use of this model compared 
with the former model reduces variance of abnormal return, which implies more powerful 
tests (CLM, 1997). 
Ri,t = αi + βi (Rmt) + ei,t  
With 
      E[ei,t] = 0  and VAR[ei,t] = 𝜎2εi   (3.2.1.1) 
Ri,t is the return on asset i on period t, Rmt is the return on portfolio m on period t, αi is 
the intercept of the value of Ri when Rm equals to zero, βi is the slope (estimate of the 
systematic risk for asset i), ei,t is the zero mean error term on the security i on the period 
t. Moreover, the variance (𝜎2εi), beta (βi), alpha (αi) and the error term (ei,t) are the 
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parameters of the model, estimated by the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. These 
parameters are estimated in the estimation period for each observation. The formulas for 
the estimation of the parameters can be seen in equation 3.2.1.1, Appendix B. 
In the Brown and Warner (1980) paper, they observed stock return data into various 
methodologies in event studies to measure security price performance based by the 
examination of the frequency of type I and type II errors and calculating the power of 
each methodology. Their findings prove that a simple methodology based on the market 
model performs well under a wide variety of conditions and the use of more sophisticated 
models can result in false inferences about the presence of abnormal performance. 
Based on these evidences, the right and the most popular model in the financial literature 
determine that this thesis will rely on the Market Model in the calculation of the expected 
normal returns.   
3.3 Estimation of the Market Model 
Through the choice of the market model with the appropriate estimate procedure (OLS) 
for the parameters made in the previous sub-section, the respectively choice of methods 
and calculations for this model will be deeply explained in the following sub-sections 
considering the choice of the UK stock market (London Stock Exchange). 
3.3.1 Abnormal Returns 
The abnormal returns are the difference between the actual return and expected return 
from the market movements, making them as essential measure to evaluate the impact of 
an event. In this way, these measures are important to help in auditing for a conclusion if 
a portfolio manager’s skills on a risk-adjusted basis and if the investors were appropriately 
compensated for the risk that they assume. The abnormal returns can be calculated by the 
following formula: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 - ?̂? - ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡  (3.3.1.1) 
Where, 𝐴𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 is the abnormal return, which is the disturbance term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 in the event 
window of the market model for firm i at the period t, 𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 is the actual return for firm i 
at the period t and the ?̂? - ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the expected return for firm i at the period t.  
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The daily stock returns are used with the logarithmic function to make the return 
distribution, converge to normality and to eliminate negative returns according to the 
market model and the tests used. This is consistent with the findings of Corrado and 
Truong (2008) were they found that the logarithmic returns perform better test 
specification in event studies. The daily logarithmic return for both stock and market are 
calculated in the following formula: 
𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 = LN (
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡−1
) ; 𝑅𝑚𝑡= LN (
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡−1
) (3.3.1.2) 
Where, 𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 is the logarithmic return of the stock i for the period t divided by the 
logarithmic return of the stock i for the day before the period t. The same applies for the 
market formula, 𝑅𝑚𝑡. 
There are two different measures to aggregate abnormal returns that normally used in the 
finance literature for an event study: BHAR (Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns) and CAR 
(Cumulative Abnormal Returns).  
The BHAR model is based on the principle of the long-term where it gives the best 
returns. This kind of model is calculated by the difference between the realized buy-and-
hold return and the normal buy-and-hold return and it is often used for long-term event 
studies such as IPO or when a major acquisition happens (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; 
Fama, 1998). Furthermore, Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999) advocate this 
model and say that the BHAR model better match the investor investment experience and 
eliminates the problem of cross-sectional dependence among the sample firms.  
However, this method requires a benchmark sample or matching stock that have not 
experience the event. Since, as it was said before every firm of the sample report their 
earnings quarterly, semi-annual or even annually and because of that the latter 
requirement is impossible to do. Besides that, we want to study earnings announcement, 
so every firm will experience the event at some day. Moreover, the MSCI UK was chosen 
as index for this study instead of the benchmark because we believe it measures with 
more precise all the constituents of the LSE stock market and it seems more appropriate 
for this kind of study.   
While it is true that BHAR perform better for long-term studies, it is also true that the 
CARs perform better for short-term studies. Furthermore, Fama (1998) argues in favor of 
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the use of CARs instead of the BHARs given the theoretical and statistical considerations. 
For these reasons, we decided to use the Cumulative Abnormal Returns method. 
3.3.2 Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
A hierarchy of abnormal returns calculated are compounded to cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs), which can be averaged to cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) 
in cross-sectional studies.  
The cumulative abnormal return method is normally used to determine how accurate the 
model is. More often, it is used to investigate the impact of any affect extraneous events 
on the stock prices. In additionally, Kothari and Warner (2008) say that for testing the 
semi-strong form of EMH, this measure should be used in order to see how fast the market 
react to new information. 
The CARs method is the sum of the abnormal returns of the stock i at the period t and it 
is represented as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1, 𝑇2)  = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑇2𝑡=𝑇1 𝑖, 𝑡  (3.3.2.1) 
Where, the cumulative abnormal returns over a multi-period event window by summing 
the average returns from the period T1 until the period T2. This can also be applied to the 
post-event window starting from the period T2 and goes until the period T3.  
Following, the analysis performance of abnormal returns for multiple events it may give 
typical stock market response patterns. So, the typical abnormal returns associated with a 
specific period of time of N events before and after the event day give us the following 
formula for average abnormal returns: 
𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 
1
𝑁
 ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
  (3.3.2.2) 
After following the abnormal, cumulative and average returns formulas we are able to 
form the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) where it has great statistical 
analysis importance in addition with the AAR because it assembles the effect of the 
abnormal returns. The CAAR based on cross-average measure for both event-window 
and post-window is defined by the following formula: 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 (𝑇1, 𝑇2)  = 
1
𝑁
 ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1, 𝑇2)𝑁𝑖=1  (3.3.2.3) 
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The statistical tests considering these measures will be approached deeply in the 
following section. 
3.4 Test Statistics  
The power of using test statistics is very accurately in precisely the capture of any 
abnormal returns that differ from zero with some statistical validity. The literature on 
event study test statistics is very rich, as well the significance tests. CLM (1997) claim 
that: 
“The significance of using statistical test on an event study is the ability to detect the 
presence of false null hypothesis. Thus, the likelihood that an event study test rejects the 
null hypothesis for a given level of abnormal return associated with an event is the power 
of the test” (CLM., 1997, p.168). 
The CAARs use the T-Tests to test the efficiency of the markets, this is the hypothesis of 
the CAARs being or not equal to zero defined as: 
Ho: CAAR = 0       H1: CAAR ≠ 0 
Hence, the rejection of H0 confirms a presence of anomalies in the market. A rejection of 
H1 confirms otherwise. 
This study, will include three different statistical tests in order to achieve the main purpose 
of the investigation. One parametric tests (Standardized Residual Test) and two non-
parametric tests (Rank Test and Generalized Sign Test).  
Parametric tests assume that the individual firm’s abnormal returns are normally 
distrusted. So, it makes more assumptions and the parametric data underlies on normal 
distribution, which allows to make more conclusions. Campbell and Wasley (1993) say 
that the normality of abnormal returns is a key assumption underlying to use the 
parametric tests for event studies. The non-parametric tests are based on a fewer 
assumptions and for that are less powerful than the parametric tests. However, Corrado 
(1989) on his paper describe statistic superiority of non-parametric tests over parametric 
tests in the returns case has been documented even departures from normality are not 
pronounced.   
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The following sub-sections will describe deeply each of both parametric and non-
parametric tests to be used. 
3.4.1 Parametric Tests 
The parametric test used for this event study was the standardized residual test because is the 
most popular parametric statistical test, once it has been found more robust considering 
possible volatility changes associated with the event. For details about this parametric test 
could be found in the following description. 
T1: Standardized Residual Test  
The Standardized Residual Test also as known as the Patell Test is a complement of the 
cross-sectional independence test. It was developed by Patell (1976) and the 
standardization reduces the effect of the stocks with large returns, it assumes cross-
sectional independence in abnormal returns and assumes that there is no event induced 
change in the variance across of the event period of abnormal returns.  It is estimated as:  
𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 = 
𝐴𝑅 i,t
𝑆(𝐴𝑅 i,t)
  (3.4.1.1) 
Where the standard deviation is according to his facts that the event-window abnormal 
returns are an out-of-sample forecast and the standard error is adjusted by the forecast 
error: 
𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2  = 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡
2  (1 + 
1
𝑀𝑖
+  
(𝑅𝑚,𝑡− ?̅?𝑚)2
∑ (𝑅𝑚,𝑡− ?̅?𝑚)2𝑇1𝑡=0
) 
After calculating SAR, we have: 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖, 𝑡𝑇2𝑡=𝑇𝑖,𝑇2  
And finally, to get the patell test: 
𝑇1 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 
1
√𝑁
 ∑
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1  
With, 
𝑆𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡
2  = 𝐿2 
𝑀𝑖−2
𝑀𝑖−4
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Boehmer et al. (1991) found that under the absence of an event induced variance increase, 
and that this test is well specified and has appropriate power.   
3.4.2 Non-Parametric Tests 
The following non-parametric test for this event study are the rank teste and the generalized 
sign test, which could be found in the following description. 
T2: Rank Test 
The Corrado (1989) Rank Test consider a combination of both post and event window as 
well the estimation period into a single set of returns and ranked them based on return to 
each daily for each firm: 𝐾𝑖,𝑇 = 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑇), where t = -120, …, 252. This test ranks 
from the lowest abnormal return until the highest abnormal return. To get the rank test, 
we need to follow the following steps: 
?̅?𝑇1,𝑇2 = 
1
𝐿2
 ∑ ?̅?𝑡
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1+1 , where ?̅?𝑡 = 
1
𝑁𝑡
∑ 𝐾𝑖𝑡𝑁𝑡𝑖=1  (3.4.2.1) 
Where, statics test is: 
𝑇2 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = √𝐿2 (
?̅?𝑇1,𝑇2  − 0.5 
𝑆?̅?
 ) 
And for standard deviation, we have: 
𝑆?̅?
2 
1
𝐿1+𝐿2
 ∑
𝑁𝑡
𝑁
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇𝑖  (?̅?𝑡 − 0.5)  
T3: Generalized Sign Test 
The Generalized Sign Test is an improvement of the Sign Test and was adopted by Cowan 
(1992), where it compares the proportion of positive AR around an event to a proportion 
that was not affected by the event. So, it allows the null hypothesis having positive AR to 
be different from 0.5. Moreover, this test is a binomial test whether this positive AR 
equals to 50% or not.  
The generalized sign test provides more powerful than a parametric test based on standard 
errors from cross-section of event date abnormal returns and becomes more powerful as 
the length of the event window increases (Cowan, 1992). 
It is calculated with the following formulas: 
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?̂? = 
1
𝑁
 ∑
1
𝐿1
𝑁
𝑖=1  ∑ 𝜑𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑖
𝑡=𝑇𝑖  where, 𝜑𝑖𝑡 = 1 if the sign is positive, and 0 otherwise. (3.4.2.2) 
And the GST is: 
𝑇3 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 
(𝑤−𝑁?̂?)
√𝑁?̂?(1−𝑝)
 
Where, w is the number of stocks in the event window for which CAR is positive. 
3.5 The Value Anomaly Proxies 
Following the Lakonishok et al. (1994) and the Yan and Zhao (2011) studies, we will use 
the four empirical proxies to capture the value anomaly effect: book-to-market (BM), 
earnings-to-price (EP), cash-flow-to-price (CP) and sales growth (SG). As we already 
know, the value stocks are characterized for having high (book-to-market; price-to-
earnings; cash-flow-to-price) and low sales growth, while in the opposite way is classified 
for the growth stocks. 
The use of these multiples to make classification on the value anomaly is recognized by 
several scholars (see e.g., Fama and French (1993); Lakonishok et al. (1994) Barberis and 
Shleifer (2003); Bourguignon and de Jong (2003)). 
In additionally, Fama (1998) says that these multiples produce stable results in returns. 
However, the dividend-to-price (D/P) is also used by these authors, but the problem of 
this proxy is that produce a weaker performance compared with the other multiples.  
The book-to-market compares the book value of a firm to its market value. According to 
Fama and French (1992) this measure has a strong role in explaining cross-sectional 
average returns on the stocks of the stock exchange. Moreover, Fama and French (1995) 
say that the market and size factors can explain the behavior of earnings, but there is no 
link between the B/M factors in earnings and returns. 
Regarding the earnings-to-price compares the P/E of a stock to a cumulative P/E of a 
related market index. This is useful because it helps if the performance of a stock was 
adequate or not to the overall market performance. Basu (1983) shows that E/P also help 
to explain the cross section of average returns, and Ball (1978) argues that E/P is a catch-
all proxy for unnamed factors in expected returns (Fama and French, 1992). 
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The cash-flow-to-price compares the amount of cash-flow generated to the price of a 
company. It offers to investors a useful tool to look to the company’s value more than 
P/E because it not includes the depreciation effects as well as the accounting differences 
related with depreciations. According to Bodie et al. (2009) this ratio is important as 
multiple because it defines the expectation of a stock’s firms price to reach when 
generates a certain level of cash flow. 
Finally, we have the sales growth in which following Lakonishok et al. (1994) it consists 
as the average of annual growth in sales over the previous five years. It is useful because 
it determines trends and how investors are prone to regard a stock with low cash flow 
relative to price and high past sales growth as having more promising future growth 
prospects (Chan and Lakonishok, 2004). 
The positive and negative of the multiples could be considered by scholars as a neglect. 
Fama and French (2007) argue that both signs are largely unexpected, while Huang et al. 
(2012) say that negative multiples causes noise to the sample. Nevertheless, we will be 
consistent with Lakonishok et al. (1994), Desai et al. (2004) and Yan and Zhao (2011) 
studies and not remove the EP and CP ratios because the negative of these multiples has 
increased in recent years and if we cut it will imply a huge cut for the final sample (Collins 
et al. 1999). However, we will eliminate the negative book-to-market ratios. 
3.6 Market Expectations and Surprises 
In order to form portfolios and detect market reaction to the event, we will follow LaPorta 
et al. (1997) and Yan and Zhao (2011) approach and use the Earnings Announcement 
Abnormal Return (EAAR).  
The market expectations have influence on how the investor or investment managers 
allocate their assets in a portfolio considering the expected risks and returns, whereas 
these assumptions increase when the assets allocated are exposed to favorable scenarios, 
and decrease when assets allocated are exposed to unfavorable scenarios. So, when the 
market expectations are taking into account it is seen as a crucial undertaking.  
In this way, the time sensitivity is a crucial factor that can shift the market expectations 
due to the tendency for data to modify in response to a large range of factors. Therefore, 
based on the number of observations and the group of EAARs to form portfolios, the 
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market expectations signs will result on the outcome of the capture sign of the EAARs. 
This is, when there is a negative sign of the market expectation, the same sign will have 
the EAARs as so when there is a positive sign of the market expectation, the same sign 
will have the EAARs: 
• Negative Market Reaction (-): EAAR < 0 
• Positive Market Reaction (+): EAAR > 0 
As concerning the importance of the market expectations Fried and Givoly (1982) in their 
study measure the performance of an alternative surrogate for the same and knowing from 
a previous study that they made in which analysts’ forecasts have information content, 
their results indicate prediction errors are more associated with the price security 
movement and with that they were able to conclude that: 
“Analysts’ forecasts provide a better surrogate for market expectations than forecasts 
generated by time-series models” (Fired and Givoly, 1982, p.85)  
The main reason, according to the authors why time series models as an alternative for 
the market expectations are not so reliable is because is further impaired by the underlying 
assumptions that the earnings generating process are stationary along with stable 
parameters and the characteristics of the model is applied to all firms involved. 
In the literature, there is a distinguish views to apply EPS surprises method, some use for 
time series models while others use for analysts’ forecasts. 
Skinner and Sloan (2002) show that growth stocks exhibit an asymmetric response to 
earnings surprises. Demonstrating, that while growth stocks are at least as likely to 
announce negative earnings surprises as positive earnings surprises, they exhibit an 
asymmetrically large negative price response to negative earnings surprises. 
While, Brandt et al. (2008) state that earnings surprises represented by SUE do not 
represent all the stock abnormal returns around the earnings announcement date. Adding 
to that, the 14%-15% of the firms subject it to SUE approach experience extreme 
announcement returns in exactly the opposite direction of the earnings surprise. 
We will rely and follow the method provided by Yan and Zhao (2011) based on the 
analyst forecasts.  
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The formula that they used can be translated as the difference between the reported EPS 
and the expected EPS, divided by the absolute value of the expected EPS1: 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑞 = 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑞−𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑞
𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑞)
  (3.6.1) 
Where, Reported EPS i,q is the actual EPS announced on the earnings announcement date 
for firms i in quarter q, and the Expected EPS i,q is the mean analyst forecast of EPS for 
firms i in quarter q. All divided by the absolute value of the Expected EPS i,q. 
The strategy implemented is conditioned on the signs of EAARs (+/-) and ES EPS (+/-
/0), where it will combine with the Value Anomaly subsample to form the final portfolio. 
Picking from the period sample and sort the stock into quintiles based on the value 
anomaly proxies, we will then allocate each stock into six subsamples based on the signs 
of both measures: When both are positive and negative; positive EAARs and negative ES 
EPS and vice versa; positive EAARs and zero ES EPS and negative EAARs and zero ES 
EPS.  
Following this, the observations are grouped in three groups defined by the sign of the 
EPS Surprise, as it is possible to see below: 
 
• Negative Surprise (-):   EPS Surprise < -1% 
• Consensus (=):    EPS Surprise > -1% < 1% 
• Positive Surprise (+):   EPS Surprise > 1% 
 
An EPS Surprise below 1% is considered negative surprise, while the opposite happens 
when an EPS Surprise is above 1% turning them as a positive surprise. When there is case 
where the EPS Surprise is located between -1% and 1%, this is considered to be in line 
with the consensus. 
For all four proxies of this work there is a variation below, consensus and above of 1%, 
except for the EP proxy where there is a variation below, consensus and above of 2% due 
                                                          
1 Expected EPS is based on projections estimated of the sum of the mean analysts’ forecasts. This is 
estimated for each company recording 3 days prior to the announcement.   
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to the number of observations observed and the selection of the final sample events. This 
line is designed to detect errors, so it can be possible to correct errors in the EPS forecast 
values. In this way, these three groups are formed to gain more robust, facilitate the 
division of groups analysed and to have roughness to find any possible difference of 
imbalance between the extremes. 
With the measures of Earnings Announcement Abnormal Return and the EPS Surprised 
grouped and formed, both combined based on the signs of the two measures we have a 
new sample split into six subsamples, which combined with the value anomaly proxied 
form the final portfolios for this study. 
Some authors, such as Jegadeesh and Livnat (2006) find that the drift may not be so strong 
because is very difficult to confirm future information to the original earnings surprise. 
Others, as Kinney et al. (2002) claim that earnings surprise is not a good indicator for 
market reactions for earnings announcement.  
In order to contradict this distortion of results, besides the initial six sub-samples we will 
add two more subsamples aside by including negative and positive earnings 
announcement abnormal return 
Finally, according to Johnson and Zhao (2011) there is a muted drift in the post-window 
compared with the event-window thankful to the decrease of earnings surprise. So, the 
decision to include the two subsamples of EAAR will lead to larger samples, more 
strengthening tests statistics and robustness to the initial six subsamples (EAAR/ES). 
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4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Having the methodology presented for this study, this chapter will serve to introduce and 
explain the data selection process described in section 4.1 as well to describe and analyse 
all the statistical data from the data chosen for all subsamples and proxies of this study 
mentioned in section 4.2. 
4.1 Data Selection 
The United Kingdom owns the main stock market exchange in Europe and one of the 
oldest and most important stock exchange markets in the world. Moreover, the London 
Stock Exchange, alongside with Deutsche Böerse and the Euronext Group represent more 
than 80% of market capitalization and listings companies in Europe. Furthermore, the 
London Stock Exchange owns by itself the third largest market capitalization in the word 
with over than £6 trillion and owing more than 2000 listings companies.2  
The London Stock Exchange has multiple markets. It is essential divided by two parts: 
LSE Main Market which is usually for large and established companies and the other part 
is the LSE AIM Market, which is more appropriate for smaller and growing companies. 
Each of them represents 52% and 48% respectively of the London Stock Exchange. 
The Thomson Reuters DataStream and the London Stock Exchange official website were 
used to collect data. Most of the data was withdrawal by DataStream once is owns the 
larger part essential of static data as timeseries data and the LSE website was essential to 
complete the data already retrieved, which was essential to have the right variables such 
as date of incorporation for the regression analysis. 
The first extraction results in all companies available in DataStream for the LSE, which 
resulted in more than 2000 firms. After a process of selection for missing ISIN, financial3 
and unclassified firms, missing and inconsistency data such quarterly announcements and 
stock price result of a total of 775 final firms as is it illustrated in figure 2. 
                                                          
2 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/companies-and-issuers/companies-and-issuers.htm 
3 Financial firms follow another Accounting principles, which may lead to a misinterpretation to approach 
for this study.   
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Figure 2 - Sample Selection 
Source: Own Creation 
The sample was extracted through DataStream to be analysed during the period between 
2010Q1-2015Q3 which with the extension for years withdraw to 2009-2016 for the 
analysing of the estimation window and the post-event window for this study. Which is 
ideal because it covers all kind of events that happened during these period: the beginning 
of the financial crisis, the post-financial crisis and the pre-brexit.  
Firstly, after the selection of firms the sample was sorted for thin traded stocks. This is 
done by observed the turnover by volume. So, all stocks during the event date that 
represent less transparency and low liquidity are eliminated with a requirement 
considering the frequency of trading. The elimination of stocks that are traded with less 
than 80% of frequency are considered as thin traded. 
As it was said in the previous chapters the MSCI UK was chosen for this study and as 
well the other values such as EPS data, quarterly announcements and the data respectful 
to the proxies’ book-to-market; earnings-to-price; cash-flow-to- price and sales growth 
was obtained from DataStream to get the final sample observations of the event as it is 
possible to observe in the figure 3. 
 
2070
• First Extraction
-838
• Financial and unclassified firms
• Missing ISIN
• Eliminating Non-UK firms
-457
• No quarterly announcemnts 
• Inconsistency in announcemnts
• Missing stock price data
775
• Final Firms Sample
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Figure 3 - Final Sample Selection for the Events 
Source: Own Creation 
Besides the book-to-market, the other proxies such as the earnings-to-price, cash-flow-
to-price and sales growth also belongs to this study. Followed by Yan and Zhao (2011), 
in the case of the last three proxies we did not eliminate negative values finding a final 
sample observation of 4139, 3286 and 3994 with 0, 853 and 145 missing values 
respectively. Moreover, the market values were also extracted for a study of a robustness 
test. For a complete list of data extraction please see appendix A. 
4.2 Data Statistics 
With the final selection made for all four proxies during the 23 quarters, now it is possible 
to see the distribution of the events as it is illustrated in the figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
17825
• First extraction of earnings announcemnts dates
-9049
• Missing or incorrect announcent dates
-2318
• Thin Trading
-2319
• Missing EPS data on the announcement date
-717
• Missing or negative book-to-market on the announcement date
3422
• Final Earnings Announcement Dates Sample
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Figure 4 - Number of Earnings Announcement per Quarter 
 
Source: Own Creation 
Note: Figure 4 represents the number of earnings announcement per quarter of each proxy from 2010Q1 
until 2015Q3 
In the above figure, is easy to see a preference of companies to report semi-annually their 
earnings announcements, while only a small portion report quarterly. So, it is easy to 
conclude that for all proxies observed the first and the third quarters are the least 
represented in this figure, while the second quarter seems to be where it meets the higher 
number of earnings announcement, gained only by a few number of EA released per 
quarter in comparison to the last quarter. Moreover, the average of EA per quarter is 
located around the 160, where the Q1 and Q3 are clearly below the average while the Q2 
and Q4 are above.  
To sum up, is to notice that in the second quarter of 2012 and 2013 represent the higher 
number of earnings announcement with around 320, 390, 290 and 380 for BM, EP, CP 
and SG respectively and in the opposite direction the Q1 and Q3 of every year represented 
around 10-20 of EA in all proxies. 
In table 1 reports the frequency of the signs for each variable and subsamples as 
concerning the EAAR and the ES corresponding for each proxy. 
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Table 1 - Frequency of the Subsample signs 
 
Note: From each panel we have the frequency of Earnings Announcement Abnormal Return and Earnings 
Surprise combining six subsamples signs for each proxy: book-to-market (BM); earnings-to-price (EP); 
cash-flow-to-price (CP) and sales growth (SG). 
In this table from panel A-D represent all the proxies, in which it is reported based on the 
observations selected. We can see a small percentage on the consensus and positive 
earnings surprise with around 3%-5% and 12%-13% respectively against the 83%-84% 
of negative earnings surprise. This could be explained by the earnings forecast uncertainty 
due the period of time selected and could also meaning a suspicious of firms 
“manipulating” their earnings due to a small positive earnings surprise.  
Meanwhile, the EAAR seems to be more even, with about 59%-60% against 40%-41% 
when EAAR is positive and negative respectively making a difference of less than 700 
observations in total between them. Even so, this could mean a size problem, since small 
companies are the ones who normally exhibit greater abnormal returns. Nevertheless, the 
values are close due to the corrections made on the sample selection regarding with firms 
with liquidity problems.    
The table 2 shows a statistical analysis of the full sample observation for each proxy. 
Sign ES>0 ES=0 ES<0 Total Sign ES>0 ES=0 ES<0 Total
EAAR>0 269 60 1711 2040 EAAR>0 287 119 2022 2428
EAAR<0 182 43 1157 1382 EAAR<0 213 79 1419 1711
Total 451 103 2868 3422 Total 500 198 3441 4139
EAAR>0 8% 2% 50% 60% EAAR>0 7% 3% 49% 59%
EAAR<0 5% 1% 34% 40% EAAR<0 5% 2% 34% 41%
Total 13% 3% 84% 100% Total 12% 5% 83% 100%
Sign ES>0 ES=0 ES<0 Total Sign ES>0 ES=0 ES<0 Total
EAAR>0 254 58 1632 1944 EAAR>0 284 87 1989 2360
EAAR<0 181 40 1121 1342 EAAR<0 212 53 1369 1634
Total 435 98 2753 3286 Total 496 140 3358 3994
EAAR>0 8% 2% 50% 59% EAAR>0 7% 2% 50% 59%
EAAR<0 6% 1% 34% 41% EAAR<0 5% 1% 34% 41%
Total 13% 3% 84% 100% Total 12% 4% 84% 100%
Panel A - BM Panel B -EP
Panel C - CP Panel D - SG
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Table 2 -  Summary Statistic 
 
Note: Table 2 for panel A and B report the summary statistics for the full sample of key variables from 
2010Q1 until 2015Q3. Obs: total number of quarter firm observations. MV: the market value of equity in 
million pounds. It is defined as the outstanding shares multiplied by the price of the stock. BM: book-to-
market ratio. EP: earnings-to-price ratio. CP: cash-flow-to-price ratio. SG: annual average growth in sales 
over the previous five years. In table B reports the earnings surprise and the earnings announcement 
abnormal return in event window (-1;1) of each proxy (book-to-market; earnings-to-price; cash-flow-to-
price and sales growth) used as a final sample selection. For details about the use of formulas in panel B 
please go to the chapter 3. 
The table 2 represents the descriptive statistics of all variables used for this study 
concerning the number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum in panel A, as well the ES and EAAR of all four proxies in panel B. 
In panel A, reports a total of 18980 firm-quarter observations among all variables during 
the sample period between 2010Q1-2015Q3. The mean and the median for BM is much 
larger than comparing with other three proxies with 0.77 and 0.47 against between 0.04-
0.17 for the mean and 0.04-0.08 for the median respectively. Both means and medians 
are slightly larger comparing the findings of Yan and Zhao (2011) and smaller than those 
in Desai et al. (2004). 
Still, to notice in panel A that the minimum and maximum value for the market value as 
a range of 1.12-165,829 £M. 
As for the panel B, the EAAR has a mean and median 0.67%-0.83% and 0.97%-1.09% 
respectively for all proxies which is considered to have a positive skewed distribution, 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std Min Max
MV 4139 6812.60 862.41 18507.97 1.12 165829.01
BM 152 0.78 0.49 1.65 0.00 18.95
EP 4139 0.04 0.06 0.52 -26.72 6.69
CP 3286 0.17 0.04 11.36 -526.32 222.22
SG 3994 0.13 0.08 3.48 -50.00 100.00
Variable Obs Mean Median Std Min Max
ES_BM 3422 -35.66% -12.07% 332.94% -967.23% 1223.75%
ES_EP 4139 -46.03% -12.81% 370.30% -967.23% 1223.75%
ES_CP 3286 -39.19% -11.93% 340.74% -700.00% 1223.75%
ES_SG 3994 -41.68% -41.68% 338.95% -892.00% 1223.75%
EAAR_BM 3422 0.83% 1.09% 7.16% -55.55% 43.00%
EAAR_EP 4139 0.67% 0.97% 7.65% -85.67% 53.73%
EAAR_CP 3286 0.78% 1.03% 6.90% -69.21% 43.00%
EAAR_SG 3994 0.74% 1.01% 7.48% -85.67% 53.73%
Panel B Descriptive statistics
Panel A Descritive statistics
32 
 
while on the other hand, the quarterly earnings surprise is negative skewed with a range 
of -36% and -46% for the mean and -12% and -41% respectively. These findings are 
consistent with Yan and Zhao (2011). 
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5. Empirical Evidence 
In this chapter will be conducted a test for normality to strengthen the parametric tests in 
section 5.1. Secondly, we will analyse the sample observations of their initial reactions in 
the event and post-earnings announcement drift in section 5.2. Thirdly, the results of all 
proxies will be analyse for their signs and respective portfolios in section 5.3. Last, but 
not least the regression analysis will be made to explain any underlying factor caused by 
the drift in the conducted study in section 5.4. 
5.1 Normality Test 
The reason why the normality test was chosen, is to see in terms descriptive statistics if 
the measure of data was perfectly matched with the normal model. In this way, we can 
judge if the data was or not well modeling by a normal distribution.  
Based on parametric tests, the normality test is as all parametric tests more powerful than 
the non-parametric tests. So, it will bring stronger results in detecting any smaller 
difference in the sample size. 
To test the normality of the data, the Jarque-Bera test was chosen to statistical analysis 
for the goodness-of-fit test. This test was used for all post-event windows, as well for the 
event window (-1,1). The formula is described below in the following formula:  
JB = 
𝑛
6
 (𝑆2 +  
1
4
 𝐾2)  (5.1.1) 
Where, n is represented as the number of observations, S is the skewness and K stands 
for the kurtosis of the sample’s abnormal return.  
A characterization of the skewness and the kurtosis is to expect values as result to be zero 
and three respectively. Any result deviating from these values will increase the test 
statistic.  
Furthermore, since we have a large sample size the test statistic is compared with the chi-
squared distribution with two degrees of freedom4. If there is evidence of excess from the 
test statistic in relation to the critical value of the chi-squared, then the null hypothesis for 
the normality is rejected. The chi-squared is the commonly used test, once it can be used 
                                                          
4 Chi-squared critical values with two degrees of freedom: 1%=4.61; 5%=5.99 and 10%=9.21 
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for any kind of distribution, so we can assume from their popularity is support among 
scholars. 
In the table 3 from panel A-D we show the evidence of results for full sample from every 
proxy event observation selected previously to conduct the Jarque-Bera test. 
Table 3 -  Jarque-Bera Test for Normality 
 
Note: The table 3 in all panels represents the Jarque-Bera Test for Normality of using the full number of 
quarter events over the 2010Q1 until 2015Q3 for the event window (-1;1), as well for the post-event window 
(2;22), (2;63), (2;126), (2;189) and (2;252). Each panel stands for each proxy used for the final sample 
selection. BM (book-to-market); EP (earnings-to-price); CP (cash-flow-to-price) and SG (annual average 
growth in sales over the previous five years). 
From all panels in the table above is evident that in every sample period from the event-
window and the post-event windows, the test statistics exceed the critical value. From this 
Window N Min Max Mean Std Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque Bera Prob
-1__1 3422 -0.56 0.43 0.01 0.07 -1.02 8.34 10505.09 0.00
2__22 3422 -0.88 0.68 0.00 0.10 -0.05 7.36 7721.89 0.00
2__63 3422 -1.34 1.12 -0.02 0.19 0.03 4.94 3478.95 0.00
2__126 3422 -1.73 1.52 -0.03 0.31 -0.09 4.19 2506.56 0.00
2__189 3422 -2.52 2.64 -0.05 0.43 -0.15 4.69 3154.26 0.00
2__252 3422 -3.36 3.13 -0.05 0.56 -0.09 4.43 2805.70 0.00
Window N Min Max Mean Std Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque Bera Prob
-1__1 4139 -0.86 0.54 0.01 0.08 -1.38 13.33 31957.52 0.00
2__22 4139 -0.88 0.96 0.00 0.11 0.18 8.23 11712.00 0.00
2__63 4139 -1.98 1.86 -0.03 0.22 -0.04 7.77 10400.53 0.00
2__126 4139 -3.01 2.47 -0.03 0.35 -0.11 6.91 8244.27 0.00
2__189 4139 -4.33 3.48 -0.06 0.49 -0.30 7.41 9539.08 0.00
2__252 4139 -5.86 4.55 -0.07 0.63 -0.22 6.96 8390.80 0.00
Window N Min Max Mean Std Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque Bera Prob
-1__1 3286 -0.69 0.43 0.01 0.07 -1.03 9.49 12910.38 0.00
2__22 3286 -0.59 0.83 0.00 0.10 0.28 6.65 6091.98 0.00
2__63 3286 -1.34 1.15 -0.02 0.20 -0.06 5.60 4295.16 0.00
2__126 3286 -2.24 1.52 -0.03 0.31 -0.17 4.69 3028.24 0.00
2__189 3286 -3.89 2.65 -0.05 0.44 -0.34 6.64 6092.27 0.00
2__252 3286 -3.36 3.13 -0.05 0.56 -0.15 4.73 3081.90 0.00
Window N Min Max Mean Std Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque Bera Prob
-1__1 3994 -0.86 0.54 0.01 0.07 -1.32 13.23 30270.90 0.00
2__22 3994 -0.88 0.96 0.00 0.10 0.17 8.41 11779.56 0.00
2__63 3994 -1.98 1.86 -0.02 0.21 0.11 8.49 12014.27 0.00
2__126 3994 -2.45 2.47 -0.03 0.34 0.11 6.56 7174.59 0.00
2__189 3994 -3.89 3.48 -0.05 0.47 -0.03 6.98 8102.08 0.00
2__252 3994 -3.36 4.55 -0.06 0.60 0.10 5.96 5919.53 0.00
Panel A - BM
Panel B - EP
Panel C - CP
Panel D - SG
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evidence, we reject the null hypothesis and we conclude saying that the sample is not 
normally distributed showing evidence of anomalies in the stock market.  
Moreover, from every panels the skewness and kurtosis achieved deviating numbers from 
what was supposed. Even if the skewness represents results closer to zero in some 
windows, the same does not happen to kurtosis from the deviation of three. Whereas, the 
stronger value is located in the event window with 8.34, 13.33, 9.49 and 13.23 and as for 
the smaller values are situated in the fourth windows with the exception for panel D where 
is detected in the final windows representing 4.19, 6.91, 4.69 and 5.96 for BM, EP, CP 
and SG respectively. Moreover, the skewness seems to be negatively larger in the event 
window comparing with following post-event windows and an agreement seems to have 
with turning skewness positive to the left in the second windows for all panels. 
Having thick tails, there is some windows that approximate to the expected skewness and 
kurtosis values for a normal distribution. 
Despite the rejection of the null hypothesis, the non-parametric test should be used 
anyways to reinforce the robust results. 
5.2 Sample Observations 
In this subsection, it is illustrated in the figures 5a and 5b in full window (-1;252) for each 
proxy, the initial reaction of event window and post-event window of portfolios P1-P5 
and P6-P10 when earnings announcement abnormal returns and earnings surprise are 
positive and negative, and the following figure show us the same thing, but only for the 
earnings announcement abnormal return portfolio observations. In additionally, a hedge 
portfolio will be added for each group of portfolios. This section is important in order to 
have a clearly idea to see the market reaction of the market incorporating information, as 
well to see the reaction of investors through drifts in post-event window. 
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Figure 5a - PEAD using proxies: EAAR/ES Portfolios - Value, Glamour and Hedge Portfolios 
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Figure 5b - PEAD using proxies: EAAR Portfolios - Value, Glamour and Hedge Portfolios 
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From the figures illustrated in 5a and 5b displayed over the 252-day event window, which 
correspond to a one year trading days, is evident that in the first trading days there is still 
a process of absorbing the initial information release of the earnings announcements 
delivered by the companies, adjusting in the event window, where the drifts are more 
clearly in the post-event window. So, it rejects the idea that the market reflects all 
information available purpose by the weak and semi-strong form of EMH.  
The portfolios P1-P5 and P6-P10 seem to be very close with one and another across the 
time except the CP P1-P10 and EP P6-P10 EAAR/ES and EAAR portfolios achieving 
extreme returns -10% and nearly 30% respectively and as concern of the latter group of 
portfolios in getting negative returns of -10% and -40%.   
The glamour and value positive portfolios seem to gain more drift in the CP EAAR/ES 
figure for P5 starting to drift up in day 30 and gain more evidence in day 130, and P1 for 
SG EAAR/ES drifting up in the day 40. As respect of negative glamour value portfolios, 
this is more evident for the BM for both EAAR/ES and EAAR portfolios drifting down 
around the day 30. 
Moreover, for both figures there is a positive effect for P1-P5 and a negative effect for 
the P6-P10 generating a very profitable hedge portfolio around 20%-40%. 
The following sections will describe the portfolio results for every subsample signs and 
the robustness of this study.  
5.3 Results using Both Anomalies 
In this part, we will see the results for the aim of this investigated study that compose for 
linking the value anomalies directly with the post-earnings and announcement drift. The 
portfolios were formed into quintiles based on the proxy classification of each of them. 
In total, for each observation of PEAD and the corresponding linking value anomaly, 30 
portfolios were made for the six-subsamples based on the signs of EAAR (+/-) and ES 
(+/-/0), allocating each stock into one of these six subsamples. 
Additionally, as justified in the previous sections we also analysed the signs of EAAR 
isolated when the sign is negative and when the sign is positive. The formation of 
portfolios was also sorted into quintiles based on the classification of each value anomaly. 
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Moreover, the construction of the portfolio starts with the 3-day event window and the 
drifts extend over the 1-month, 3-months, 6-months, 9-months and 1-year post-window. 
The number of observations and the market value, as well the value of the anomaly ratio 
is also added for each portfolio.  
5.3.1 Post-Earnings Announcement Drift using BM 
The table 4a reports the investigation results of post-earnings announcement drift and the 
BM classification. The portfolios were sorted into quintiles, where the value stocks refer 
to stocks with highest classification and glamour stocks are denoted for having lowest 
classification based on the BM.   
In table 4b is illustrated the portfolios of EAAR signs, sorted into quintiles based on the 
BM classification. 
Table 4a - Results: EAAR/ES portfolios using BM as a proxy 
 
Note: The values are represented in CAAR-values for each corresponding event window and post-event 
window based on the BM classification portfolio. The significant levels are representing by: * for 10%, ** 
representing 5% and *** denotes for 1% under T1 Standardized Residual Test. If the values are in grey 
shaded then is either T2: Rank Test or T3 Generalized Sign Test, supporting the rejection. Every panel and 
full results can be consulted in Appendix C in table 7. 
 
BM_rank obs MV (M £) BM EAAR (%) 1mth (%) 3mth (%) 6mth (%) 9mth (%) 1yr (%)
Glamour 1 54 7130 0.17 4.72*** 0.52 -0.02 1.61 1.44 3.75
2 45 7434 0.40 4.37*** 1.57 3.38 5.08* 4.02 8.21
3 48 9143 0.68 5.54*** -0.62 0.08 4.86 7.06 14.03**
4 68 3865 0.97 4.09*** -0.08 1.15 3.71 3.50 6.02
Value 5 54 6115 3.16 5.66*** 1.28 3.66 5.35 0.90 3.74
Glamour 1 175 6156 0.14 -4.43*** -1.71** -3.8* -7.51*** -10.68** -15.75**
2 242 4625 0.33 -4.47*** 0.19 -3.23*** -7.61*** -10.71*** -14.57***
3 215 2936 0.53 -5.59*** -0.35 -4.32*** -6.15** -9.79*** -10.91***
4 244 6781 0.85 -3.96*** -1.27** -5.47*** -7.39*** -11.52*** -14.49***
Value 5 104 3552 2.58 -7.31*** -2.98*** -9.88** -12.46** -15.38*** -15.04***
Spread 10.09      2.99         7.46         12.86      11.58      19.49      
Panel A: Earnings Surprise>0 & EAARs>0
Panel B: Earnings Surprise<0 & EAARs<0
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Table 4b - Results: EAAR portfolios using BM as a proxy 
 
Note: The values are represented in CAAR-values for each corresponding event window and post-event 
window based on the BM classification portfolio. The significant levels are representing by: * for 10%, ** 
representing 5% and *** denotes for 1% under T1 Standardized Residual Test. If the values are in grey 
shaded then is either T2: Rank Test or T3 Generalized Sign Test, supporting the rejection.  
The first notice that appeals in both tables is when EAAR and ES agrees on negative sign 
and when EAAR has negative sign, both have strong evidence to indicate a large amount 
of results with significance level with less support of the parametric tests in relation to 
the non-parametric tests. Most of the significance levels are performing at 1%, with only 
a few exceptions in the 6-month window and for P6 in 3-month, 9-month and 1-year 
window also seen in the figures 5a-5b. Only the 1-month window failed almost exclusive 
for evidence of the non-parametric test at significance level with exception for the last 
portfolio. 
Our drift results support the findings of Yan and Zhao (2011) achieving positive drifts 
when earnings surprise and earnings announcement abnormal return are positive (Panel 
A), and when have negative earnings surprise (Panel B and Panel C). Given the idea that 
the stock price moves in the same direction of earnings surprise, increasing the drift across 
every post window. On the other hand, the when the earnings surprise are positive and 
negative earnings announcement abnormal return (Panel D), contradicts the findings from 
the author. Assuming, that stock prices and earnings surprise move in different directions. 
Another contradiction with Yan and Zhao (2011) is the 3-day event window in having 
more volatile glamour stocks than value stocks, which do not match with our result except 
when ES are consensus and EAAR are positive (Panel E). However, from both tables 
BM_rank obs MV (M £) BM EAAR (%) 1mth (%) 3mth (%) 6mth (%) 9mth (%) 1yr (%)
Glamour 1 462 5485 0.15 4.82*** 0.75** -0.46 0.15 -0.17* -0.35
2 472 4005 0.34 4.45*** 0.13 -0.85* -0.68 -1.94** -1.48
3 395 3158 0.56 4.6*** -0.18 -1.88* -2.19* -2.85*** -2.9***
4 426 5720 0.91 4.45*** -0.22** 0.73 1.52 2.29 4.42
Value 5 285 2802 2.40 6.15*** 0.26 1.74 4.84** 1.49 3.98
Glamour 1 283 5933 0.14 -4.28*** -1.2* -3.71*** -7.1*** -10.47*** -15.18***
2 301 4311 0.34 -4.5*** -0.18 -3.74*** -7.58*** -10.27*** -13.61***
3 250 3135 0.54 -5.3*** -0.05 -2.83** -4.41*** -7.35*** -8.94**
4 296 6196 0.88 -3.88*** -1.01*** -5.57*** -7.03*** -11.52*** -13.98***
Value 5 252 3222 2.80 -7.56*** -2.36*** -8.06*** -9.5** -13.76*** -14.4***
Spread 10.43 1.46 5.45 11.94 11.96 19.16
Panel A:  EAARs>0
Panel B: EAARs<0
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these findings that value stocks outperform glamour stocks are more in agreement with 
the evidence from LLSV (1997). 
Moreover, the value stocks seem to be more in “favourable” than the glamour stocks. 
Value stocks characterized by trading at a lower price relative to its fundamentals are 
more attractive for the analysts, believing that this kind of stocks are undervalued and 
have profitable opportunities thinking that the price will rise. Therefore, the market 
reaction of EAAR to ES is wider than glamour stocks, making investors to get 
overconfident turning them overreacting due private information (Daniel et al. 1998). 
This is also confirming for the drifts in almost post-windows for every panel, supporting 
the evidence by Yan and Zhao (2011). 
When ES and EAAR are positive and EAAR are positive, the glamour portfolio shows 
differences in the 1-year window exhibited 3.75% and -0.35% drift respectively. 
Contrary, the drift values in the same period for the value portfolio when both ES and 
EAAR are negative as well the EAAR portfolio negative sign show similar results 3.74% 
and 3.98% respectively. Following the same pattern for close results when both ES and 
EAAR are negative and when EAAR is negative it shows around 14%-15% drift. As 
concerning the spread also show similar close results for ES and EAAR and EAAR with 
19.49% and 19.16% in 1-year post window before transaction costs. Since, we employ 
quarterly earnings announcement data the annualized mean abnormal return is larger for 
EAAR and ES portfolios with 29.84% than the EAAR portfolios with 21.8% before 
transaction costs. So, the return is larger when earnings announcement abnormal return 
and earnings surprise follow their signs. 
Overall, is visible a long side phenomenon specially in value stocks where it appears to 
be stronger and therefore is a possible explanation for investors underreact to earnings 
announcement and a connection between earnings and price momentum. 
In the following subsection, we investigated PEAD using other proxies to see if the 
conclusions results remain. 
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5.3.2 Post-Earnings Announcement Drift using other proxies 
From tables 8a-10a and 8b-10b report the earnings announcement abnormal return with 
earnings surprise portfolios and the earnings announcement abnormal return portfolios 
respectively, where it is possible to see the post-earnings announcement drift using 
different proxies for value and glamour stocks based on EP, CP and SG proxies. The 
portfolios were sorted into quintiles based on the proxies’ classification. For the first two 
proxies, the value stocks refer stocks with the highest ranking and lowest ranking for the 
glamour stocks. As concerns the sales growth, the value stocks refer to stocks with the 
lowest sales growth, while the glamour stocks refer to highest stocks. In additionally, as 
it happens previously for BM besides the six sub-samples regarding the sings of the ES 
and EAAR, we also show tables with two more subsamples by isolating the sign of EAAR 
(see appendix C). 
The first notice is the same as made before when using the BM as a proxy. When EAAR 
and ES agrees on negative signs, as well when EAAR is negative it generates larger 
amount of drift results supporting the rejection using the non-parametric tests. Once 
again, most of the results were performed at 1% significant level, with just a few 
exceptions in the post-event windows specially in the 6-month window. The exception 
maintains in the 1-month window in failing evidence with significance level for the non-
parametric tests, scaping only the last portfolios for EP and CP and the first for SG. 
Then, the glamour stocks in CP and SG when earnings surprise and EAARs portfolios 
are positive in the 3-day announcement window (Panel A) are smaller than the value 
stocks. This is consistent with the finding when using BM as a proxy, only EP agrees with 
the findings of Yan and Zhao (2011). When earnings surprise and EAAR portfolios are 
negative the EP and CP agrees with the findings of the author saying that the value stocks 
are more positive than the glamour stocks, but the SG agrees with our findings made with 
for the BM proxy. 
In general, for every panel (Panel A-F) in each proxy the value stocks seem to outperform 
the glamour stocks. Given the idea again that there is a preference of analysts in these 
stocks, believing that the price of the stock is trading at a below price from what is worth. 
In the post-event window, the value stocks exhibit larger drifts at 1-year window with 
13.99% and 31.25% when both ES and EAAR are positive for EP and CP respectively 
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and 7.42% for glamour stocks in SG proxy putting a contradiction with the result of the 
value stocks for being smaller than the latter. This is also evident for Yan and Zhao (2011) 
evoking LLSV (1997) for the reason to use CP and GS two-way classification. 
The EAAR portfolios when are positive and when are negative confirms, taking only a 
few exceptions, that for the post-event window the value stocks have in general a better 
performance than the glamour stocks, making consensus with the findings when we used 
BM as a proxy. 
Finally, the abnormal return for EAAR and ES portfolio for each proxy was 44.38%, 
42.38% and 16.67% before transaction costs in the 1-year windows for EP, CP and SG 
respectively and for EAAR portfolio was 33.89%, 21.33% and 13.24% before transaction 
costs for the same period. As we considered quarterly earnings announcement data the 
annualized average abnormal return is 36.6%, 45.52% and 25.72% for EAAR and ES 
portfolios and 37.28%, 31.76% and 18.8% for EAAR portfolio for EP, CP and SG 
respectively. Thus, the same conclusion remains when we use portfolios based on BM 
classification in which the EAAR and ES portfolios generate larger spread returns than 
the EAAR portfolios.   
The section 5.4 will present an explanation of this results by a regression analysis. 
5.4 Regression Analysis 
The regression analysis will be useful to quantity the relationship of our post-event event 
days with other variables and to know how close and well the relationship is. Fama and 
Macbeth (1973) conducted a regression analysis for a PEAD saying that this anomaly is 
based on testing and analysis. Their regression analysis resulted that the coefficients and 
residual of risk return are coefficients with the “efficient capital market”. Our regression 
analysis will investigate the explanatory factors of PEAD such as: information 
uncertainty purposed by Zhang (2006) and others from prior literature. 
In this way, the regression analysis will be based in two signs of earnings announcements 
portfolios when are positive and when are negative. The reason why did not employ the 
regression analysis based on the earnings announcement and earnings surprise when both 
are positive and negative besides, the already reason said previously in the beginning of 
this chapter is because we want to explore the influence of the earnings surprise sign on 
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the earnings announcement drifts. So, the ES will be part as dummy variable, the EAAR 
event window and each proxy based on their classification portfolio, as well the other 
independent variables will serve to examine the outcomes. 
To complete the extraction of variables, following the latter author three more 
independent variables will be included: Age, Number of Analysts and the Market Cap. 
The firm age is measured by the age of firm´s incorporation until the announcement date 
and the number of analysts covering a stock is important because they represent a key 
financial variable. Furthermore, the last variable to be included is the Beta, that 
determines the volatility of the portfolio comparing with the market to explain the drift 
as tested by Bernard and Thomas (1989). 
The regression analysis is presented in the following table 5 for BM and other tables 11-
13 for EP, CP, and SG respectively (see Appendix D), as well for full results of all proxies 
is also available in the same appendix. 
Table 5 - Regression Analysis for PEAD using BM 
 
Note: In this table is possible to analyse the regression for the post-earnings announcement drift using book-
to-market as a proxy. For panel A we have positive earnings announcement abnormal returns sample with 
2040 events and for the panel B we have same but when is negative with 1382 events. The dependent 
variables are the cumulative average abnormal return for the post-event windows (2;22), (2;63), (2;126), 
(2;189) and (2;252). The independent variables are the earnings announcement abnormal return (EAAR) 
Dependent Variable EAAR Age Coverage Beta ES Market Cap BM Constant
Panel A:EAAR>0 N = 2040
-0.2 0 0.01
(-3.74***) (-2.62***) (2.07**)
-0.44 0.02 -0.01
(-6.41***) (2.95***) (-1.95*)
-0.93 -0.001 0 -0.02 0.08
(-19.13***) (-6.41***) (3.25***) (-2.93***) (16.97***)
-0.85 -0.03 0.03 0.07
(-6.19***) (-2.18**) (1.80*) (5.44***)
-1.03 -0.05 0.04 0.1
(-4.85***) (-2.37**) (1.88*) (4.73***)
Panel B:EAAR<0 N = 1382
-0.13
(-2.12**)
-0.57 -0.01
(-7.34***) (-1.83*)
-1.05 0.0003 0.0012 0.013 -0.07
(-16.04***) (2.16**) (2.80***) (1.78*) (-12.55***)
-1.27 0.0007 0.003 0.03 -0.16
(-7.84***) (1.93*) (3.57***) (1.87*) (-11.2***)
-1.19 0.0008 0.0056 0.05 -0.2
(-5***) (1.69*) (3.70***) (1.91*) (-9.66***)
0.0145
0.0263
0.175
0.0257
0.0184
CAAR(2:22)
CAAR(2:63)
CAAR(2:126)
CAAR(2:189)
CAAR(2:252)
CAAR(2:189) 0.0641
CAAR(2:252) 0.0394
CAAR(2:22) 0.0052
CAAR(2:63) 0.0393
CAAR(2:126) 0.1708
𝑅2
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for the event window (-1;1). Age: Difference between the date of incorporation and the event date. 
Coverage: Number of analysts covering a stock. Beta: estimated beta for stock i, calculated by the market 
model. ES: earnings surprise. Market Cap: market value of equity in million pounds for the stock I at the 
event date. BM: book-to-market ratio for the stock i at the event date. Constant: interception value in the y-
axis. 𝑅2: coefficient of determination. The significant levels are representing by: * for 10%, ** representing 
5% and *** denotes for 1%. The regression equation is determined by the following formula: 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅ⅈ,𝑡=𝛼+𝛽1∗#𝐶𝐴𝑅_−1_1𝑖(EAAR)+𝛽2∗𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3∗𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+𝛽4∗𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖+𝛽5∗𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡+𝛽6∗𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘e𝑡 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡+𝛽7∗𝐵M𝑖,𝑡 + Ɛ. For more details about the formula please see Appendix D. 
From other tables (see appendix D) we can see about half of the table has significant 
variables, whereas the event window is the only independent variable represented as 
significantly in all post-event windows in both panels. Curiously, all EAAR has shown 
negative results this could lead with the explanation of the information asymmetric 
theory. Thus, according to Francis et al., (2007) the greater PEAD profitability is 
associated with the greater information uncertainty, this is seen specially in panel B where 
the drifts follows the same sign, and the number of analysts follow the opposite sign. 
The 𝑅2 values are considered as low values in all panels for the four regressions analysis, 
which may be the conclusion of the information uncertainty. However, the highest 𝑅2 is 
obtained in the 6-month window for all panels and regressions with a range that around 
about between 15.5% and 21% in all four regressions analysis, that is the same to say, 
this window is the most suitable for the model. Regarding the constant it represents 
significant and different values in all post-event windows, with the exception for the one-
month window whereas it does not occur. And when the constant occurs for both panels 
it follows the signs of each panel, by having for most of the cases positive coefficient for 
panel A and negative coefficient for panel B in all four regression analysis.   
In what concerns to the proxies’ BM, EP, CP and SG in general they present contradiction 
sign values with the respective sign of the panel in all post-windows. For BM ratio 
independent variable, there is particularly no significant correlation, but for the remain 
proxies they increase as the post-window increases, showing more significant correlation. 
In fact, this confirms with the results from the previously sections. 
The number of analysts and the age of firms is confirmed more in panel B for the BM, 
EP, CP and SG regression analysis verifying more in the last windows where the age firm 
and the number of analysts increases from window to window as simultaneously the 
EAAR verifies larger negative drifts in this panel and windows. For Beta, in an overall 
analysis it seems that is following their panel signs with only a few exceptions in BM and 
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EP regressions. This beta results looks like they are corresponding to the swings of the 
market sign, but not by the corresponding high r-squared. In fact, when we have beta and 
earnings surprise in the same post-window they do not match with the same sign, either 
for panel A or B, this is when one beta is negative the other is positive and vice versa. 
This is supported with the findings of Ball (1992) in the response of betas to earnings. 
The earnings surprise produces significantly when earnings announcement abnormal 
return is positive (Panel A). So, the earnings surprise has positive influence on drifts. This 
is agreed with the findings of Johnson and Zhao (2011) and Yan and Zhao (2011). But, 
in some cases (BM, EP) when earnings announcement abnormal return is negative (Panel 
B) the earnings produce positive influence on drifts, therefore investors overreact the 
information incorporated in earnings surprise.  
Finally, the market capitalization, as well the BM, across all panels from all tables has 
practically no appearance in all dependent variables and when has is only in the 6-month 
window and the value is almost null. Moreover, this lack of correlation between market 
cap, BM and PEAD is also visible in Foster et al. (1984) study. The following section 
will serve to conduct robustness tests in order to support or not the results tested until 
now. 
To sum up, in all four regression analysis for both panels it seems to have negative or 
positive relationship with the exception of the market capitalization in which had no 
relationship. Moreover, the six-month window is the most suitable window indicated a 
relationship of 17%-17.5%, 16%-16.7%, 19.7%-21%, 15.5%-16% in each panel for BM, 
EP, CP and SG respectively. 
5.5 Robustness Checks  
The robustness tests will be based on the size effects of the London Stock Exchange 
companies. Similar, to previous subsections a quintile portfolio was formed based on each 
proxy classification, but to control size effect we separate the portfolios into small and 
big firms. 
We chose firm size effect as our robustness test because we want to see if there are any 
differences regarding the firm size companies on how fast investors respond to new 
information, and if there is any information asymmetry surrounding earnings release. 
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As a large stock market, the London Stock Exchange has wide listings companies but also 
a wide market value that ranges from £1.12M to £165,829.01M. In this way, we are able 
from the market value of each company to determine the composition group portfolio of 
the companies in each will be inserted, if they are small or big firms. The size break-
points used for study is determined based each stock market value with the relative 
minimum and maximum threshold for each category, as it is defined by (LSE, 2010): 
• Small Cap < £297M 
• Medium Cap < £2.3B > £297M 
• Large Cap > £2.3B 
The small firms will incorporate stocks with the Small and Medium Cap, while the big 
firms will denote stocks that incorporate the Large Cap category. 
From tables 6a-6b (see below), 14a-16a and 14b-16b (see Appendix E) show each 
robustness tests portfolios for EAAR with ES signs and EAAR sign based on size 
portfolio ranking using each proxy. 
Table 6a - Robustness Check: EAAR/ES portfolios using BM as a proxy – Size Effect 
 
Note: The values are represented in CAAR-values for each corresponding event window and post-event 
window based on the Size/BM classification portfolio. The significant levels are representing by: * for 
10%, ** representing 5% and *** denotes for 1% under T1 Standardized Residual Test. If the values are 
in grey shaded then is either T2: Rank Test or T3 Generalized Sign Test, supporting the rejection. Every 
size/ proxy portfolio can be consulted in Appendix E 
 
Size_rank BM_rank obs MV (M £) BM EAAR (%) 1mth (%) 3mth (%) 6mth (%) 9mth (%) 1yr (%)
Small Glamour 1 23 890 0.21 5.29*** 0.06 -0.16 0.91 3.83 6.4
Small Value 5 45 379 3.98 6.27*** 1.9 5.94 10.84 7.26 11.7
Spread 0.98 1.84 6.1 9.93 3.43 5.3
Big Glamour 1 23 18282 0.13 3.93*** 1.01 -0.38 4.18 2.35 0.69
Big Value 5 22 20028 1.55 3.11*** -0.29 -1.74 -5.25* -7.3** -6.19
Spread -0.82 -1.3 -1.36 -9.43 -9.65 -6.88
Small Glamour 1 96 732 0.15 -4.92*** -3.3** -5.64* -8.52** -13.39*** -18.61***
Small Value 5 195 243 3.03 -7.22*** -2.67** -11.83*** -13.44** -17.33*** -18.76***
Spread -2.3 0.63 -6.19 -4.92 -3.94 -0.15
Big Glamour 1 70 17585 0.12 -3.14*** -0.14 -1.71 -6.16** -8.44*** -10.79*
Big Value 5 127 23579 1.36 -3.85*** -1.9* -3.99*** -5.97* -9.81*** -10.93***
Spread -0.71 -1.76 -2.28 0.19 -1.37 -0.14
Spread Small 11.19 5.2 11.58 19.36 20.65 30.31
Spread Big 6.25 -0.15 -0.03 0.91 1.14 4.6
Panel A: Earnings Surprise>0 & EAARs>0
Panel B: Earnings Surprise<0 & EAARs<0
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Table 6b - Robustness Check: EAAR portfolios using BM as a proxy – Size Effect 
 
Note: The values are represented in CAAR-values for each corresponding event window and post-event 
window based on the size/BM classification portfolio. The significant levels are representing by: * for 10%, 
** representing 5% and *** denotes for 1% under T1: Standardized Residual Test. If the values are in grey 
shaded then is either T2: Rank Test or T3 Generalized Sign Test, supporting the rejection. Every EAAR 
portfolio for each proxy can be consulted in Appendix E. 
Similarly, with the empirical results for every robustness checks when EAAR and ES 
agree on negative sign and when EAAR has negative sign in the size/proxy portfolios 
they show more significantly evidence, particularly in the non-parametric tests.  
Analyzing the 3-day event window it seems that from size/proxies’ results met our first 
results on having more volatile value stocks than glamour stocks, having a bigger 
difference between values when we compare each stock (glamour vs value) in each panel 
and by panel (Panel A vs Panel B), looking the value stocks results by sign at the event 
window and the same thing when we look to the glamour stocks, the difference between 
value comparing glamour is notable. Indeed, this is inconsistent with Yan and Zhao 
(2011), the only truth is verified for the size/EP portfolios. 
In the post-event windows, when EAAR/ES is positive and when is negative (Panel A 
and Panel B) the small firm size portfolios show to have more significant drifts for BM, 
EP, CP and SG than the big firm size portfolios. Yet, all big glamour and value stocks 
show to be significant in 1-year window when EAAR/ES are negative demonstrating 
drifts with -10.79%, -13.22%, -5.55%, and -5.03% for glamour stocks and drifts for the 
Size_rank BM_rank obs MV (M £) BM EAAR (%) 1mth (%) 3mth (%) 6mth (%) 9mth (%) 1yr (%)
Small Glamour 1 125 672 0.17 5.57*** 0.76 -1.92 -1.75 -3.14 -4.1
Small Value 5 411 235 2.70 5.95*** 0.47 2.29 5.82** 4.12* 8.07***
Spread 0.38 -0.29 4.21 7.57 7.26 12.17
Big Glamour 1 151 12953 0.27 4.12*** -0.09 -0.97 -0.69 -1.56* -1.81
Big Value 5 186 16474 0.80 3.48*** -0.11 0.75 0.61 1.22 1.76
Spread -0.64 -0.02 1.72 1.3 2.78 3.57
Small Glamour 1 105 712 0.15 -4.77*** -2.77** -5.85** -9.42*** -15.74* -21.46***
Small Value 5 249 231 3.28 -7.47*** -1.5 -9.3*** -9.95*** -15.36*** -17.63***
Spread -2.7 1.27 -3.45 -0.53 0.38 3.83
Big Glamour 1 90 16982 0.11 -3.14*** 0.4 -1.25 -4.58*** -6.22*** -8.7*
Big Value 5 162 22855 1.34 -3.7*** -1.85*** -3.76*** -5.72** -9.47*** -10.83***
Spread -0.56 -2.25 -2.51 -1.14 -3.25 -2.13
Spread Small 10.72 3.24 8.14 15.24 19.86 29.53
Spread Big 6.62 -0.51 2 5.19 7.44 10.46
Panel A: EAARs>0
Panel B: EAARs<0
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same period with -10.93%, -8.31%, -10.59% and -3.08% for value stocks respectively for 
each proxy. The same situation occurs when we look for the EAAR portfolios. When 
negative sign imposes the big glamour stocks produces a drift of -8.7%, -9.94%, -5.42% 
and -5.28% in the same time period as before and for value stocks -10.83%, -6.54%, -
7.31% and -3.74% respectively for each proxy. 
Another finding is that in general regardless the sign for EAAR/ES and for EAAR the 
value stocks generates higher PEAD than glamour stocks, they either show to be more 
positive or less negative, even so this comparison can be seen with more evidence when 
the sign is positive. This is consistent with our empirical results and with the findings of 
Yan and Zhao (2011). 
Finally, in a combination spread the small portfolios obtain with a big difference a higher 
spread than the big portfolios. This is seen for EAAR/ES portfolios with 30.31%, 58.97%, 
44.88% and 21.09% for BM, EP, CP and SG size portfolio at 1-year windows, which 
translated in quarterly to annually is 46.32%, 45.12%, 55.8% and 23.04% respectively. 
The same spread difference from small portfolios to big portfolios is seen in EAAR 
portfolios with 29.53%, 48.42%, 34.37% and 20.7% for BM, EP, CP and SG size 
portfolio at 1-year windows, which translated from quarterly to annually is 32.56%, 
54.76%, 46% and 28.72%. 
From this robustness check it was possible to see evidence value stocks outperform 
growth stocks, confirming our previously results and we also could see that there is 
evidence of small firm effect in the London Stock Exchange, whereas this firms with 
characteristics from having a small capitalization produce greater growth opportunities 
comparing with larger firms. In additionally, the small cap companies are riskier than 
companies with larger capitalization, so they have higher returns as consequently are 
known to tend more volatile business environment. 
These findings are also consistent with the findings of Foster et al. (1984) where it says 
the smaller the firm size, the larger is the PEAD. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this study, we investigated the relationship between two anomalies, the post-earnings 
announcement drift and the value anomaly, in the UK stock exchange using the book-to-
market, earnings-to-price, cash-flow-to-price and sales growth as proxies for the value 
anomaly. Hereupon, it was constructed EAAR/ES and EAAR portfolios regarding their 
signs for glamour and value stocks based on the proxies’ classification and profitable 
opportunities with the conditionals signs was designed to challenge the EMH. 
We found that by rejecting the null hypothesis and proceeding a regression analysis there 
is a presence of anomalies and a relationship between the two anomalies, adding also 
significant and different constant values in every post-event window except for the first 
post-event window in every proxy. Moreover, we also found some evidences that 
challenge the Efficient Market Hypothesis. According, to the study of Liu, et al., (2003) 
we could also agree that the UK has an inefficient stock market. It is shown that there are 
significant drifts and the existence of anomalies on both signs, either positive or negative. 
Overall, the observed portfolios tend to respond from their initial reaction, drifting in the 
same direction and providing annual average abnormal return of 29.84%, 36.6%, 45.52% 
and 25.72% before transaction costs for EAAR/ES portfolios and 21.8%, 37.28%, 
31.76% and 18.8% before transaction costs for EAAR portfolios, all with respectively for 
BM, EP, CP and SG proxies. 
Our results show that based on the proxy classification the EAAR/ES portfolios have 
larger annual abnormal return, providing a larger profitable opportunity, when we 
compared with the EAAR portfolios. Furthermore, our results found to be more volatile 
in the 3-day event window for value stocks than for glamour stocks contradicting the 
findings of Yan and Zhao (2011), but in agreement with Lakonishok et al. (1994) 
evidence. So, the value stocks have more profitable opportunities than the glamour stocks 
with the same level of risk. This view is also verified in the post-windows, and now is 
also supported with the former author.  
Throughout our regression analysis, we could see a positive influence on earnings 
surprise when earnings announcement abnormal return is positive and in some case cases 
when earnings announcement abnormal return is negative. Moreover, from observations 
particularly with negative EAAR is shown a contradiction of signs between the number 
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of analysts covering a stock and the drift from the post-event windows, concluding that 
there is information uncertainty. And we could concluded that the six-month window has 
the most suitable window for all panels and regression analysis. 
As for robustness check we investigate the size effect and divided the portfolios into two 
groups, measured by small and big capitalization. Here, it was also consistent with our 
previous results that value stocks outperform growth stocks and we also checked that the 
small firms outperform the big firms, creating a small firm effect which is consistent with 
the findings of Foster et al. (1984). 
This study has significant contributions to the literature, because to best of our knowledge 
there is a lack of investigation in this field in a stock market outside of the US stock 
market, and we fill this gap by studying for the UK stock market.  
Our study has some limitations. Firstly, the event study methodology depends on 
assumptions of an efficient market. The length of time that an investor has to respond 
event signals is random, therefore this could have impact by exhibiting inefficiencies in 
the market because prices do not instantly or fully reflect all available information. 
Secondly, the period sample chosen may also have impact on the results. During the 
period from 2010Q1 until 2015Q3 occur several events, as mentioned before during this 
study, that may impact directly and/or indirectly the UK stock market. Thirdly, the use of 
a market index could lead to an underperforming by finding significant abnormal returns 
when it should not find instead of using a benchmark index. Finally, the transaction costs 
were not included. The value stocks produced higher returns than the glamour stocks with 
the same level of risk and it only give us suggestions about market opportunities, and not 
if a particular trading strategy could have been profitable over another.  
For further research, we have some suggestions. Since this theme is recent there are 
several countries where this study could be applied. Furthermore, we suggest increasing 
the sample size since most countries, particularly in Europe, were affected by the recent 
financial crisis and in this way, we can avoid some noise trading. In additionally, the 
inclusion of a benchmark portfolio method could lead a stronger and reliable 
performance. Moreover, the event-day could be increase and a shorter post-event window 
could be applied as some authors suggest in order to generate more powerful results.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Extracted Variables 
Stock Prices (P) 
MSCI Index Price (PI) 
Turnover by Volume (VO) 
Market Value of Equity (MV) 
Quarterly Earnings Announcements WC05901, WC05902, WC05903, WC05904 
EPS GAAP (GPS1TR12) 
Forward EPS GAAP (GPS1FD12) 
Trailing MTB – (1/MTB) 
Trailing PE – (1/PE) 
Trailing CF – CF/P 
Average Annual Growth in Sales over the Previous Five Years 
Date of Incorporation  
Analyst Recommendation (EPS1NE) 
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Appendix B: Formulas 
Market Model:  
Ri,t = αi + βi (Rmt) + ei,t  With  E[ei,t] = 0  and VAR[ei,t] = 𝜎2εi  
Ri,t is the return on asset i on period t, Rmt is the return on portfolio m on period t, αi is 
the intercept of the value of Ri when Rm equals to zero, βi is the slope (estimate of the 
systematic risk for asset i), ei,t is the zero mean error term on the security i on the period 
t. Moreover, the variance (𝜎2εi), beta (βi), alpha (αi) and the error term (ei,t) are the 
parameters of the model, estimated by the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. 
Beta for stock i: 
?̂?𝑖 =
∑ (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖)(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − ?̂?𝑚)𝑇1𝑡=𝑇0+1
∑ (𝑅𝑚 −  ?̂?𝑚)
2𝑇1
𝑡=𝑇0+
 
Alpha for stock i: 
?̂?= ?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖?̂?𝑚 
Variance: 
?̂?𝑒𝑖=
1
𝐿1−2
∑ (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − ?̂? − ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡)
2𝑇1
𝑡=𝑇0+1  
Where: 
?̂? =
1
𝐿1
∑ 𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑇1𝑡=𝑇0+1  and ?̂?𝑚 =
1
𝐿1
∑ 𝑅𝑚𝑡𝑇1𝑡=𝑇0+1  
Abnormal Returns  
𝐴𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 - ?̂? - ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡  
Where, 𝐴𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 is the abnormal return, which is the disturbance term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 in the event 
window of the market model for firm i at the period t, 𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 is the actual return for firm i 
at the period t and the ?̂? - ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the expected return for firm i at the period t. 
Logarithmic transformation 
𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 = LN (
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡−1
) ; 𝑅𝑚𝑡= LN (
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡−1
)    
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Where, 𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 is the logarithmic return of the stock i for the period t divided by the 
logarithmic return of the stock i for the day before the period t. The same applies for the 
market formula, 𝑅𝑚𝑡. 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1, 𝑇2)  = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑇2𝑡=𝑇1 𝑖, 𝑡  
Where, the cumulative abnormal returns over a multi-period event window by summing 
the average returns from the period T1 until the period T2. This can also be applied to the 
post-event window starting from the period T2 and goes until the period T3.  
Average Abnormal Return  
𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 
1
𝑁
 ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Cumulative Abnormal Return  
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 (𝑇1, 𝑇2) = 
1
𝑁
 ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1, 𝑇2)𝑁𝑖=1  
T1: Standardized Residual Test with Patell Adjustement  
𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 = 
𝐴𝑅 i,t
𝑆(𝐴𝑅 i,t)
  
Where the standard deviation is according to his facts that the event-window abnormal 
returns are an out-of-sample forecast and the standard error is adjusted by the forecast 
error: 
𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2  = 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡
2  (1 + 
1
𝑀𝑖
+  
(𝑅𝑚,𝑡− ?̅?𝑚)2
∑ (𝑅𝑚,𝑡− ?̅?𝑚)2𝑇1𝑡=0
) 
After calculating SAR, we have: 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖, 𝑡𝑇2𝑡=𝑇𝑖,𝑇2  
And finally, to get the patell test: 
𝑇1 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 
1
√𝑁
 ∑
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1  
With, 
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𝑆𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡
2  = 𝐿2 
𝑀𝑖−2
𝑀𝑖−4
 
T2 Rank Test:  
?̅?𝑇1,𝑇2 = 
1
𝐿2
 ∑ ?̅?𝑡
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1+1 , where ?̅?𝑡 = 
1
𝑁𝑡
∑ 𝐾𝑖𝑡𝑁𝑡𝑖=1  Where, statics test is:  
𝑇2 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = √𝐿2 (
?̅?𝑇1,𝑇2  − 0.5 
𝑆?̅?
 ) 
And for standard deviation, we have: 
𝑆?̅?
2 
1
𝐿1+𝐿2
 ∑
𝑁𝑡
𝑁
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇𝑖  (?̅?𝑡 − 0.5) 
T3 Generalized Sign Test  
?̂? = 
1
𝑁
 ∑
1
𝐿1
𝑁
𝑖=1  ∑ 𝜑𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑖
𝑡=𝑇𝑖  where, 𝜑𝑖𝑡 = 1 if the sign is positive, and 0 otherwise. And the 
GST is: 𝑇3 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 
(𝑤−𝑁?̂?)
√𝑁?̂?(1−?̂?)
 
Earnings Surprise  
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑞 = 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑞−𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑞
𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑞)
  
Jarque-Bera Test for Normality  
JB = 
𝑛
6
 (𝑆2 +  
1
4
 𝐾2)  
 Where, n is represented as the number of observations, S is the skewness and K stands 
for the kurtosis of the sample’s cumulative abnormal return.  
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Appendix C: Portfolios using Both Anomalies  
Table 7 - Full Results: EAAR/ES portfolios using BM as a proxy 
 
Note: The values are represented in CAAR-values for each corresponding event window and post-event 
window based on the EP classification portfolio. The significant levels are representing by: * for 10%, ** 
representing 5% and *** denotes for 1% under T1 Standardized Residual Test. If the values are in grey 
shaded then is either T2: Rank Test or T3 Generalized Sign Test, supporting the rejection. Every panel and 
proxy portfolio result can be consulted in Appendix C 
 
BM_rank obs MV (M £) BM EAAR (%) 1mth (%) 3mth (%) 6mth (%) 9mth (%) 1yr (%)
Glamour 1 54 7130 0.17 4.72*** 0.52 -0.02 1.61 1.44 3.75
2 45 7434 0.40 4.37*** 1.57 3.38 5.08* 4.02 8.21
3 48 9143 0.68 5.54*** -0.62 0.08 4.86 7.06 14.03**
4 68 3865 0.97 4.09*** -0.08 1.15 3.71 3.50 6.02
Value 5 54 6115 3.16 5.66*** 1.28 3.66 5.35 0.90 3.74
Glamour 1 175 6156 0.14 -4.43*** -1.71** -3.8* -7.51*** -10.68** -15.75**
2 242 4625 0.33 -4.47*** 0.19 -3.23*** -7.61*** -10.71*** -14.57***
3 215 2936 0.53 -5.59*** -0.35 -4.32*** -6.15** -9.79*** -10.91***
4 244 6781 0.85 -3.96*** -1.27** -5.47*** -7.39*** -11.52*** -14.49***
Value 5 104 3552 2.58 -7.31*** -2.98*** -9.88** -12.46** -15.38*** -15.04***
Spread 10.09      2.99         7.46         12.86      11.58      19.49      
Glamour 1 413 5681 0.16 4.73*** 0.85** -0.52 -0.12 -0.91 -1.25
2 398 4145 0.34 4.39*** -0.07 -1.32** -1.30 -2.62** -2.72*
3 333 3207 0.55 4.49*** -0.13 -2.33* -3.29* -4.58*** -5.69*
4 332 5984 0.89 4.43*** -0.33* -0.09* 0.64 1.42 3.08
Value 5 235 2991 2.25 6.4*** 0.28 2.20 5.82*** 3.74 6.47
Glamour 1 33 9503 0.17 -3.01*** 0.44* -4.82*** -3** -4.94* -8.09*
2 41 9245 0.41 -3.32*** 0.56 -1.07** -2.26 -2.55 -1.97
3 40 10754 0.76 -3.32*** -0.66 -3.55* -4.6*** -8.81* -12.74***
4 38 3511 1.07 -3.09*** 1.12 -0.32 -0.80 -4.64** -9.27**
Value 5 30 7884 3.05 -10.09*** 1.22 -3.09* -0.87 -16.02*** -23.74***
Glamour 1 15 8369 0.09 5.22*** 1.94 1.87 -2.81 0.82 1.87
2 11 1023 0.34 8.94*** -3.67 -2.96 -5.66 2.16 2.77
3 11 9010 0.53 5.62*** 2.36 4.79 3.91 7.54 12.35*
4 12 11177 0.77 3.49** -2.05 0.68 -6.61 -9.38 -11.06
Value 5 11 9983 1.18 3.23*** -3.84* -0.58 4.15 -1.85 3.83
Glamour 1 9 13529 0.21 -8.56*** -0.78 -11.96*** -15.42 -30.71** -27.99
2 8 17381 0.35 -2.75** 0.41 1.87 -6.48 -3.98 -7.56
3 8 8027 0.50 -5.11*** 1.50 6.41 13.68 20.48 22.90
4 9 14867 0.82 -4.45*** -1.95 -4.85 0.77 3.16 8.07**
Value 5 9 2716 3.38 -13.31*** 0.10 -1.02 4.74 -4.81 2.74
Panel F: Earnings Surprise=0 & EAARs<0
Panel A: Earnings Surprise>0 & EAARs>0
Panel B: Earnings Surprise<0 & EAARs<0
Panel C: Earnings Surprise<0 & EAARs>0
Panel D: Earnings Surprise>0 & EAARs<0
Panel E: Earnings Surprise=0 & EAARs>0
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Table 8a - Results: EAAR/ES portfolios using EP as a proxy 
 
Note: The values are represented in CAAR-values for each corresponding event window and post-event 
window based on the EP classification portfolio. The significant levels are representing by: * for 10%, ** 
representing 5% and *** denotes for 1% under T1 Standardized Residual Test. If the values are in grey 
shaded then is either T2: Rank Test or T3 Generalized Sign Test, supporting the rejection. Every panel and 
proxy portfolio result can be consulted in Appendix C 
 
EP_rank obs MV (M £) EP EAAR (%) 1mth (%) 3mth (%) 6mth (%) 9mth (%) 1yr (%)
Glamour 1 42 2927 -0.33 6.39*** 3.69** 0.58 -1.95 -6.88* -13.59***
2 50 1295 0.05 5.69*** 1.18*** 2.30 3.13 1.12 3.17
3 56 7429 0.06 4.25*** -0.78 0.34 3.29* 1.23 4.10
4 56 10760 0.08 3.93*** 1.45 4.85 8.33** 10.94* 12.88*
Value 5 83 6829 0.17 4.63*** -0.62 -0.58 5.15 6.61* 13.99**
Glamour 1 251 1187 -0.31 -7.66*** -3.32*** -9.73*** -17.25** -25.62*** -30.39***
2 312 1577 0.04 -5.18*** -1.51*** -6.31*** -9.6*** -14.62*** -17.94***
3 316 4434 0.06 -4.18*** -0.90 -4.12*** -6.94*** -10.3*** -11.94***
4 317 7162 0.07 -4.1*** -0.42 -3.81*** -6.8*** -10.51*** -12.84***
Value 5 223 5013 0.18 -6.95*** -2.06* -8.92*** -9.05*** -11.77* -16.6***
Spread 12.29 2.70 9.15 22.40 32.23 44.38
Glamour 1 281 1156 -0.25 6.51*** 1.62 1.00 2.75 -0.58 0.42
2 417 1470 0.04 5.21*** 0.93** -0.23 0.64 0.50 0.22
3 524 4228 0.06 4.14*** -0.03 -0.97** -0.76 -2.05*** -2.09***
4 482 7331 0.08 4.52*** 0.00 -0.8* -0.12 0.11 -0.16
Value 5 318 4208 0.16 5*** -0.26 -1.36* -1.85 -4.45*** -6.13***
Glamour 1 37 1230 -0.28 -9.12*** -2.70 -8.56*** -12.77*** -31.51*** -55.4***
2 31 2759 0.04 -3.4*** 3.01** 0.06 0.71 -4.04* -6.48*
3 44 9791 0.06 -3.21*** 0.2* -3.23** -3.84* -9.98** -13.7**
4 45 9642 0.08 -3.22*** -1.00 -3.85** -6.58** -8.58** -8.62*
Value 5 56 11299 0.20 -4.58*** -0.01 -3.22* -3.38*** -6.66*** -6.3**
Glamour 1 20 486 -0.08 6.15*** -3.94** 3.25 12.40 1.63 12.77
2 25 2476 0.05 5.48*** -3.43 -7.02** -10.1* -9.22 -5.47
3 24 6855 0.07 2.48*** 0.68 1.20 -6.41** -4.16 -4.49
4 27 10930 0.09 4.48*** -0.13 2.76 0.99 0.02 -1.33
Value 5 23 10757 0.14 6.4*** 2.27 3.15 0.52 -3.86 -8.10
Glamour 1 16 311 -0.20 -7.57* 0.44 -13.16 -25.21 -41.41** -50.12**
2 15 4609 0.04 -5.7*** -2.73 -8.09 -14.56*** -17.25** -16.9**
3 14 3509 0.07 -3.81*** -0.64 1.86 7.42** 8.56*** 13.14***
4 16 8476 0.08 -3.66*** 1.95** 4.19 7.25 7.21 6.16
Value 5 18 25770 0.12 -7.49*** -1.56 -2.9* -0.41 0.14 3.82
Panel F: Earnings Surprise=0 & EAARs<0
Panel A: Earnings Surprise>0 & EAARs>0
Panel B: Earnings Surprise<0 & EAARs<0
Panel C: Earnings Surprise<0 & EAARs>0
Panel D: Earnings Surprise>0 & EAARs<0
Panel E: Earnings Surprise=0 & EAARs>0
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Table 8b - Results: EAAR portfolios using EP as a proxy 
 
Note: The values are represented in CAAR-values for each corresponding event window and post-event 
window based on the EP classification portfolio. The significant levels are representing by: * for 10%, ** 
representing 5% and *** denotes for 1% under T1 Standardized Residual Test. If the values are in grey 
shaded then is either T2: Rank Test or T3 Generalized Sign Test, supporting the rejection. Every panel and 
proxy portfolio result can be consulted in Appendix C 
 
EP_rank obs MV (M £) EP EAAR (%) 1mth (%) 3mth (%) 6mth (%) 9mth (%) 1yr (%)
Glamour 1 309 1059 -0.26 6.26*** 1.83** 1.46 3.46 -0.52 0.37
2 461 1390 0.04 5.66*** 0.69* -0.58 -0.18 -0.61 -0.66
3 632 4153 0.06 4.11*** -0.03 -0.77* -0.33 -1.46*** -1.17***
4 569 7072 0.08 4.45*** 0.02 -0.27 0.33 0.48 0.24
Value 5 457 4040 0.16 4.92*** -0.06 -0.53 0.12 -1.5** -1.39
Glamour 1 291 1089 -0.31 -7.72*** -3.27*** -9.85*** -18.01*** -28.17*** -35.28***
2 348 1468 0.04 -5.34*** -1.09** -5.95*** -8.36*** -13.6*** -17***
3 371 4247 0.06 -4.01*** -0.81 -4.15*** -6.9*** -10.35*** -12.24***
4 409 7363 0.08 -4.06*** -0.69* -3.67*** -6.11*** -9.6*** -11.75***
Value 5 292 4170 0.19 -6.49*** -1.21* -6.95*** -6.84*** -9.17** -12.12***
Spread 12.64 3.21 9.32 18.13 26.67 33.89
Panel A: EAARs>0
Panel B:  EAARs<0
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Table 9a - Results: EAAR/ES portfolios using CP as a proxy 
 
Note: The values are represented in CAAR-values for each corresponding event window and post-event 
window based on the CP classification portfolio. The significant levels are representing by: * for 10%, ** 
representing 5% and *** denotes for 1% under T1 Standardized Residual Test. If the values are in grey 
shaded then is either T2: Rank Test or T3 Generalized Sign Test, supporting the rejection. Every panel and 
proxy portfolio result can be consulted in Appendix C 
 
CP_rank obs MV (M £) CP EAAR (%) 1mth (%) 3mth (%) 6mth (%) 9mth (%) 1yr (%)
Glamour 1 51 4067 -0.07 4.69*** -0.56* -3.24* -1.73* -5.06*** -5.7***
2 66 8077 0.02 3.08*** -0.83 -1.97 -0.23 -3.34 -3.88
3 45 6461 0.04 5.25*** 1.52 3.63 4.44 3.5 9.67
4 52 4689 0.09 5.12*** -0.57 1.34 3.92 6.07 9.08
Value 5 40 11439 0.33 6.1*** 2.92* 6.02** 14.31** 18.96** 31.25**
Glamour 1 194 3281 -0.55 -6.35*** -0.94 -5.36*** -7.86*** -11.32*** -11.13***
2 241 7225 0.02 -3.73*** 0.93* -1.22* -2.67*** -5.46*** -7.75***
3 240 3995 0.04 -4.48*** -1.46*** -4.71*** -8.86*** -11.98*** -14.83***
4 227 5418 0.09 -4.19*** -1.58*** -6.5*** -8.47*** -13.67*** -18.3***
Value 5 219 5494 1.09 -5.97*** -1.95* -8.44*** -11.53*** -16.91*** -19.08***
Spread 12.45 3.86 11.38 22.17 30.28 42.38
Glamour 1 283 3698 -0.48 4.59*** -0.4 -0.63 -0.23 -3.47** -3.91*
2 389 6865 0.02 4.17*** 0.13 -1.38*** -1.36** -1.2** -0.83**
3 369 4137 0.05 4.58*** 0.24 -1.44*** -0.02 -0.72 -0.72
4 331 5020 0.10 4.79*** 0.66* 0.09 0.9 0.27 3.02
Value 5 260 4436 1.07 5.44*** 0.62 0.73 0.25 -1.2* -1.18*
Glamour 1 32 2495 -0.33 -7.93*** -2.77*** -9.7*** -15.21*** -29.78** -49.25***
2 32 9432 0.02 -2.62*** 1.9 -2.29* 0.16 -2.75 -1.39
3 44 7629 0.04 -2.78*** -0.01 -1.41* -1.13* -6.17*** -8.51***
4 38 9439 0.09 -4.04*** 0.98 -1.11* -3.93** -8.15** -11.22*
Value 5 35 10039 0.67 -5.85*** 1.56 -0.89 -1.3 -6.46** -10.24**
Glamour 1 12 4608 -0.54 7.84*** 0.9 -1.29 -2.04 -0.42 1.8
2 12 12548 0.03 3.28*** 0.67 4.45 2.89 7.77* 11.15*
3 12 10021 0.07 4.01*** 0.22 -0.09 -4.03 -4.38* -8.25**
4 11 12148 0.12 4.63*** -2.89 1.59 3.22 11.41 22.31**
Value 5 11 3274 0.33 4.26*** -0.8 7.53* 11.78* 13.81* 16.54
Glamour 1 10 787 -0.97 -6.03*** -3.43* -18.8 -26.94 -49.1* -52.07
2 6 10888 0.02 -5.17** -1.4 -2.19 -1.57 -8.55 -12.56
3 10 12874 0.04 -6.15*** 1.22 -1.81 3.97 8.75 21.67**
4 6 16737 0.08 -3.78** 0.35 -0.94 0.33 1.2 5.27
Value 5 8 31626 0.59 -5.49** -2.75 3.4 7.11 12.22 14.23
Panel F: Earnings Surprise=0 & EAARs<0
Panel A: Earnings Surprise>0 & EAARs>0
Panel B: Earnings Surprise<0 & EAARs<0
Panel C: Earnings Surprise<0 & EAARs>0
Panel D: Earnings Surprise>0 & EAARs<0
Panel E: Earnings Surprise=0 & EAARs>0
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Table 9b - Results: EAAR portfolios using CP as a proxy 
 
Note: The values are represented in CAAR-values for each corresponding event window and post-event 
window based on the EP classification portfolio. The significant levels are representing by: * for 10%, ** 
representing 5% and *** denotes for 1% under T1 Standardized Residual Test. If the values are in grey 
shaded then is either T2: Rank Test or T3 Generalized Sign Test, supporting the rejection. Every panel and 
proxy portfolio result can be consulted in Appendix C 
 
CP_rank obs MV (M £) CP EAAR (%) 1mth (%) 3mth (%) 6mth (%) 9mth (%) 1yr (%)
Glamour 1 322 3149 -0.47 4.7*** -0.38 -0.99* -0.34 -3.64*** -4.11*
2 475 6954 0.02 4.04*** -0.04 -1.42*** -1.25** -1.59*** -1.22**
3 431 4123 0.05 4.59*** 0.39 -0.88** 0.44 -0.19 0.35
4 419 5037 0.10 4.83*** 0.63* 0.53 1.48 1.46 4.45*
Value 5 297 4062 1.08 5.55*** 0.59 1.48 2.2 1.77 3.3
Glamour 1 228 2625 -0.53 -6.6*** -1.09* -6.46*** -9.21** -15.59*** -18.03***
2 286 7391 0.02 -3.64*** 0.71 -1.58** -3.18* -5.41*** -7.62***
3 298 4011 0.04 -4.32*** -1.02** -3.9*** -6.8*** -10.12*** -12.21***
4 270 5266 0.09 -4.19*** -1.3** -5.83*** -7.77*** -12.81*** -17.04***
Value 5 260 5222 1.10 -5.91*** -1.46*** -7.1*** -9.68** -14.69*** -16.94*
Spread 12.15 1.68 7.94 11.41 17.36 21.33
Panel A:  EAARs>0
Panel B:  EAARs<0
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Table 10a - EAAR/ES portfolios using SG as a proxy 
 
Note: The values are represented in CAAR-values for each corresponding event window and post-event 
window based on the EP classification portfolio. The significant levels are representing by: * for 10%, ** 
representing 5% and *** denotes for 1% under T1 Standardized Residual Test. If the values are in grey 
shaded then is either T2: Rank Test or T3 Generalized Sign Test, supporting the rejection. Every panel and 
proxy portfolio result can be consulted in Appendix C 
 
SG_rank obs MV (M £) SG EAAR (%) 1mth (%) 3mth (%) 6mth (%) 9mth (%) 1yr (%)
Value 1 57 7535 -0.64 5.22*** 0.29 1.72 4.72 1.26 4.55
2 50 5403 -0.01 5.32*** 4.07 5.28 8.67 8.35 12.14
3 45 5014 0.07 5.54*** 1.05 -0.24 6.21 7.34* 11.83**
4 74 7696 0.15 3.57*** -0.32 0.64 1.41** 1.94** 4.09
Glamour 5 58 6085 0.72 4.64*** -0.33 1.23 3.36 6.32 7.42
Value 1 145 6900 -0.61 -5.1*** -1.94*** -5.98** -7.69*** -11.2*** -13.69***
2 248 2532 0.00 -6.61*** -2.72*** -10** -14.64** -20.98* -24.82***
3 252 2226 0.06 -5.97*** -0.64 -3.99** -7.08*** -12.26* -16.62***
4 287 4006 0.13 -4.42*** -1.1** -5.15*** -8.59*** -12.09** -15.65**
Glamour 5 292 4596 0.98 -4.56*** -0.67 -4.71* -7.11*** -10.21*** -12.12***
Spread 9.78 0.96 6.43 11.83 11.47 16.67
Value 1 410 6501 -0.62 4.95*** 0.38 0.38 1.71 0.45 2.95
2 308 2429 0.00 5.73*** 2.17*** 2.11* 3.73* 2.68 2.75
3 397 2215 0.07 5.04*** 0.05 -0.88 -1.26 -2.41** -4.12***
4 467 3784 0.14 4.33*** -0.36 -1.33*** -1.02** -1.62*** -2.84***
Glamour 5 407 4394 1.00 4.52*** 0.3 -0.8* -0.31 -1.15 -1.15
Value 1 41 10689 -0.67 -3.53*** -1.07 -2.46 -1.41 0.64 -1.93
2 43 3445 -0.07 -5.85*** -0.55 -8.78* -17.07** -31.45*** -40.7***
3 37 7515 0.05 -6.22*** 2.46 -1.87** -2.85** -8.91* -14.73**
4 47 8999 0.15 -4.07*** 1.01 1.77 1.84 -1.28* -4.93***
Glamour 5 44 4312 1.34 -3.08*** 1.12 -3.12** -1.14* -8.26* -8.5***
Value 1 18 9906 -0.97 4.84*** 0.37 0.86 -3.02 -9.33 -10.93
2 16 1007 -0.01 6.05*** -0.66 5.22 10.66 1.99 -1.43
3 14 1560 0.05 7.05*** -7.13** -4.7 -5.28 -18.16* -15.12
4 18 8070 0.13 4.44*** 2.13 6.34* 8.29 14.47 19.88**
Glamour 5 21 9722 0.48 4.54*** 0.27 -1.35 -3.9 3.19 2.43
Value 1 9 17566 -1.42 -11.77** 1 2.02 1.43 -1.86 -0.9
2 9 8129 -0.01 -5.78*** -5.14 -10.14 -10.08 -17.01 -17.83
3 13 12137 0.08 -6.54*** -0.27 -8.07** -3.57 -0.8 6.58
4 12 9024 0.19 -5.41*** -2.74 -0.48 0.14 6.54 4.18
Glamour 5 10 7789 0.42 -1.87** -2.31 -3.28 -4.64 -9.91 -13.64
Panel F: Earnings Surprise=0 & EAARs<0
Panel A: Earnings Surprise>0 & EAARs>0
Panel B: Earnings Surprise<0 & EAARs<0
Panel C: Earnings Surprise<0 & EAARs>0
Panel D: Earnings Surprise>0 & EAARs<0
Panel E: Earnings Surprise=0 & EAARs>0
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Table 10b - Results: EAAR portfolios using SG as a proxy 
 
Note: The values are represented in CAAR-values for each corresponding event window and post-event 
window based on the EP classification portfolio. The significant levels are representing by: * for 10%, ** 
representing 5% and *** denotes for 1% under T1 Standardized Residual Test. If the values are in grey 
shaded then is either T2: Rank Test or T3 Generalized Sign Test, supporting the rejection. Every panel and 
proxy portfolio result can be consulted in Appendix C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SG_rank obs MV (M £) SG EAAR (%) 1mth (%) 3mth (%) 6mth (%) 9mth (%) 1yr (%)
Value 1 485 6255 -0.63 4.97*** 0.36 0.54 1.88 0.19 2.53
2 369 2352 0.00 5.7*** 2.22* 2.82** 4.65** 3.11 3.73
3 446 2121 0.06 5.25*** 0.02 -1 -0.63 -1.75* -2.86**
4 559 3721 0.13 4.1*** -0.34* -0.93*** -0.54** -0.72** -1.17**
Glamour 5 501 4243 0.98 4.62*** 0.3 -0.48 0.19 0.09 0.12
Value 1 345 6422 -0.67 -5.02*** -1.32* -5.05*** -6*** -9.71*** -12.05***
2 294 2496 -0.01 -6.58*** -3.02* -10.09** -15.29** -22.38** -26.78***
3 230 2122 0.06 -6.07*** -0.18 -4.07*** -6.77*** -11.2*** -15.26***
4 355 3823 0.13 -4.42*** -0.92** -4.35*** -7.53*** -11.02*** -14.89***
Glamour 5 350 4398 0.95 -4.31*** -0.47 -4.16* -5.76*** -9.08*** -10.71***
Spread 9.28 0.83 4.7 7.64 9.27 13.24
Panel A: EAARs>0
Panel B: EAARs<0
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Appendix D: Other Regressions and full Results 
The Regression Analysis was estimated in the ESM program, inserting the following 
regression equation for: book-to-market, earnings-to-price, cash-flow-to-price and sales 
growth proxies. 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅ⅈ,𝑡=𝛼+𝛽1∗#𝐶𝐴𝑅_−1_1𝑖(EAAR)+𝛽2∗𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3∗𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+𝛽4∗𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖+𝛽5∗𝐸
𝑆𝑖,𝑡+𝛽6∗𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘e𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡+𝛽7∗𝐵M𝑖,𝑡 + Ɛ 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅ⅈ,𝑡=𝛼+𝛽1∗#𝐶𝐴𝑅_−1_1𝑖(EAAR)+𝛽2∗𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3∗𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+𝛽4∗𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖+𝛽5∗𝐸
𝑆𝑖,𝑡+𝛽6∗𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘e𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡+𝛽7∗EP𝑖,𝑡 + Ɛ 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅ⅈ,𝑡=𝛼+𝛽1∗#𝐶𝐴𝑅_−1_1𝑖(EAAR)+𝛽2∗𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3∗𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+𝛽4∗𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖+𝛽5∗𝐸
𝑆𝑖,𝑡+𝛽6∗𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘e𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡+𝛽7∗CP𝑖,𝑡 + Ɛ 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅ⅈ,𝑡=𝛼+𝛽1∗#𝐶𝐴𝑅_−1_1𝑖(EAAR)+𝛽2∗𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3∗𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+𝛽4∗𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖+𝛽5∗𝐸
𝑆𝑖,𝑡+𝛽6∗𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘e𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡+𝛽7∗SG𝑖,𝑡 + Ɛ 
Where:  
CAAR_i,t = Cumulative Average Abnormal Return for portfolio i in post-event window 
t 
CAR_-1;1 = Cumulative Abnormal Return for stock i in event window (-1;1) for event at 
time t 
Age_i,t = Difference between the date of incorporation and the date of the event for the 
stock i 
Coverage_i,t = Number of Analysts covering a stock i at time t (event date -3 days) 
Beta_i = Estamated beta for stock i, calculated by the market model 
EPS_i,t= Dummy variable for Earnings Surprise (1= ES >0, 0=ES <0) for stock i at the 
event date t. 
Market Cap_i,t = Market value of equity in million pounds for the stock i at the time t 
(event date -3 days) 
BM_i,t = Book-to-market for the stock i at the time t (event date -3 days) 
EP_i,t = Earnings-to-price for the stock i at the time t (event date -3 days) 
CP_i,t = Cash-flow-to-price for the stock i at the time t (event date -3 days) 
SG_i,t = Annual average growth in sales over five years for the stock i at the time t (event 
date -3 days) 
ε = Error term  
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Table 11 - Regression Analysis of PEAD using EP as a proxy 
 
Note: In this table is possible to analyse the regression for the post-earnings announcement drift using book-
to-market as a proxy. For panel A we have positive earnings announcement abnormal returns sample with 
2040 events and for the panel B we have same but when is negative with 1382 events. The dependent 
variables are the cumulative average abnormal return for the post-event windows (2;22), (2;63), (2;126), 
(2;189) and (2;252). The independent variables are the earnings announcement abnormal return (EAAR) 
for the event window (-1;1). Age: Difference between the date of incorporation and the event date. 
Coverage: Number of analysts covering a stock. Beta: estimated beta for stock i, calculated by the market 
model. ES: earnings surprise. Market Cap: market value of equity in million pounds for the stock I at the 
event date. EP: earnings-to-price ratio for the stock i at the event date. Constant: interception value in the 
y-axis. 𝑅2: coefficient of determination. The significant levels are representing by: * for 10%, ** 
representing 5% and *** denotes for 1%. The regression equation is determined by the following formula: 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅ⅈ,𝑡=𝛼+𝛽1∗#𝐶𝐴𝑅_−1_1𝑖(EAAR)+𝛽2∗𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3∗𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+𝛽4∗𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖+𝛽5∗𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡+𝛽6∗𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘e𝑡 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡+𝛽7∗EP𝑖,𝑡 + Ɛ. For more details about the formula please see Appendix D. 
 
Dependent Variable EAAR Age Beta Coverage EP ES Market Cap Constant
Panel A:EAAR>0 N=2428
-0.1512
(-2.9267***)
-0.4368 0.0198 -0.0098
(-6.8696***) 3.1957*** (-1.9196*)
-0.8712 -0.0076 0 0.0705
(-19.805***) (-1.416***) (-1.7154*) 20.033***
-0.9302 -0.0202 0.0245 0.0557
(-7.1225***) (-1.2634*) 1.657* 5.3234***
-0.9903 0.0435 0.066
(-4.939***) 1.9203* 4.1096***
Panel B:EAAR<0 N=1711
-0.1315 -0.0001
(-2.484**) (-0.3529**)
-0.6653 0.0135 -0.0003 -0.0153
(-9.835***) 1.785* (-0.557***) (-2.4208**)
-0.9075 0.0003 -0.0116 0.0122 0.0156 -0.0731
(-17.005***) 2.4327** (-1.9345*) 1.6165*** 2.1774** (-14.6459***)
-1.06 0.0008 0.0049 0.0387 0.0341 -0.1772
(-7.5892***) 2.1805** 4.6653* 1.9617*** 1.8146* (-13.5612***)
-1.0092 0.0013 -0.0407 0.008 0.0938 -0.2352
(-4.8066***) 2.411** (-1.7332*) 5.1138*** 3.1666*** (-11.9743***)
CAAR(2:252) 0.0508
CAAR(2:63) 0.0616
CAAR(2:126) 0.1669
CAAR(2:189) 0.0636
CAAR(2:189) 0.0242
CAAR(2:252) 0.013
CAAR(2:22) 0.0082
CAAR(2:22) 0.0058
CAAR(2:63) 0.0245
CAAR(2:126) 0.1608
𝑅2
69 
 
Table 12 - Regression Analysis of PEAD using CP as a proxy 
 
Note: In this table is possible to analyse the regression for the post-earnings announcement drift using book-
to-market as a proxy. For panel A we have positive earnings announcement abnormal returns sample with 
2040 events and for the panel B we have same but when is negative with 1382 events. The dependent 
variables are the cumulative average abnormal return for the post-event windows (2;22), (2;63), (2;126), 
(2;189) and (2;252). The independent variables are the earnings announcement abnormal return (EAAR) 
for the event window (-1;1). Age: Difference between the date of incorporation and the event date. 
Coverage: Number of analysts covering a stock. Beta: estimated beta for stock i, calculated by the market 
model. ES: earnings surprise. Market Cap: market value of equity in million pounds for the stock I at the 
event date. CP: cash-flow-to-price ratio for the stock i at the event date. Constant: interception value in the 
y-axis. 𝑅2: coefficient of determination. The significant levels are representing by: * for 10%, ** 
representing 5% and *** denotes for 1%. The regression equation is determined by the following formula: 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅ⅈ,𝑡=𝛼+𝛽1∗#𝐶𝐴𝑅_−1_1𝑖(EAAR)+𝛽2∗𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3∗𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+𝛽4∗𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖+𝛽5∗𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡+𝛽6∗𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘e𝑡 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡+𝛽7∗CP𝑖,𝑡 + Ɛ. For more details about the formula please see Appendix D. 
 
Dependent Variable EAAR Age Beta Coverage CP ES Market Cap Constant
Panel A:EAAR>0 N=1944
-0.1257 -0.0004
(-2.189**) (-1.116**)
-0.3819 0.0181 -0.0009 -0.0048
(-5.44***) 2.85*** (-2.19***) (-4.91**)
-0.9899 -0.0001 0 0.0754
(-20.26***) (-0.138***) (-1.84*) 17.879***
-0.8251 0.0631
(-5.82***) 5.1575***
-0.9273 0.0868
(-4.263***) 4.6242***
Panel B:EAAR<0 N=1342
-0.1061 -0.0171
(-1.98**) (-2.49**)
-0.6108 -0.0181
(-8.883***) (-2.4189**)
-0.9397 0.0002 0.0004 -0.064
(-18.023***) 1.8244* 0.3664* (-11.297***)
-1.3097 0.0036 -0.0082 -0.1622
(-9.014***) 3.4671*** (-2.993***) (-10.28***)
-1.3965 0.0009 0.0056 -0.0124 -0.2143
(-6.626***) 1.817* 3.6621*** (-3.126***) (-9.3588***)
CAAR(2:252) 0.0577
CAAR(2:63) 0.0613
CAAR(2:126) 0.2088
CAAR(2:189) 0.0802
CAAR(2:189) 0.0215
CAAR(2:252) 0.0135
CAAR(2:22) 0.0108
CAAR(2:22) 0.0073
CAAR(2:63) 0.0332
CAAR(2:126) 0.1975
𝑅2
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Table 13 - Regression Analysis of PEAD using SG as a proxy 
 
Note: In this table is possible to analyse the regression for the post-earnings announcement drift using book-
to-market as a proxy. For panel A we have positive earnings announcement abnormal returns sample with 
2040 events and for the panel B we have same but when is negative with 1382 events. The dependent 
variables are the cumulative average abnormal return for the post-event windows (2;22), (2;63), (2;126), 
(2;189) and (2;252). The independent variables are the earnings announcement abnormal return (EAAR) 
for the event window (-1;1). Age: Difference between the date of incorporation and the event date. 
Coverage: Number of analysts covering a stock. Beta: estimated beta for stock i, calculated by the market 
model. ES: earnings surprise. Market Cap: market value of equity in million pounds for the stock I at the 
event date. SG: annual average growth in sales over five years for the stock i at the event date. Constant: 
interception value in the y-axis. 𝑅2: coefficient of determination. The significant levels are representing by: 
* for 10%, ** representing 5% and *** denotes for 1%. The regression equation is determined by the 
followingformula:𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅ⅈ,𝑡=𝛼+𝛽1∗#𝐶𝐴𝑅_−1_1𝑖(EAAR)+𝛽2∗𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3∗𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+𝛽4∗𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖+𝛽5∗𝐸
𝑆𝑖,𝑡+𝛽6∗𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘e𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡+𝛽7∗SG𝑖,𝑡 + Ɛ. For more details about the formula please see Appendix D. 
EAAR >0 for BM 
 
Dependent Variable EAAR Age Beta Coverage ES Market Cap SG Constant
Panel A:EAAR>0 N=2360
-0.1606 0.0087 -0.0004
(-3.022***) 1.7483* (-0.3368**)
-0.5118 0.0167 -0.0086
(-7.85***) 2.728*** (-1.697*)
-0.8786 0.002 0.001 0.0707
(-19.096***) 0.4109* 0.9676*** 19.773***
-0.7868 -0.0022 0.0017 0.0599
(-5.8067***) (-2.6765*) 0.5607*** 5.6891***
-0.6364 -0.0034 0.0031 0.0667
(-3.0725***) (-2.7079*) 0.6632*** 4.1454***
Panel B:EAAR<0 N=1634
-0.1466 0.0001
(-2.8265***) 0.262*
-0.658 -0.0177
(-9.7633***) (-2.8193***)
-0.8967 0.0003 0.0016 -0.0005 -0.0743
(-16.373***) 2.3946** 4.0352** (-0.307***) (-14.603***)
-1.0191 0.0007 0.0043 0.0019 -0.1705
(-7.265***) 1.8648* 4.1436** 0.4907*** (-13.0795***)
-1.0083 0.0011 0.0022 -0.2144
(-4.8202***) 2.0293** 0.3894*** (-11.027***)
CAAR(2:252) 0.0394
CAAR(2:63) 0.0574
CAAR(2:126) 0.163
CAAR(2:189) 0.0575
CAAR(2:189) 0.0192
CAAR(2:252) 0.0094
CAAR(2:22) 0.008
CAAR(2:22) 0.0072
CAAR(2:63) 0.0298
CAAR(2:126) 0.1552
𝑅2
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Appendix E: Robustness Check for other proxies 
Table 14a - Robustness Check: EAAR/ES portfolios using EP as a proxy – Size Effect 
 
Note: The values are represented in CAAR-values for each corresponding event window and post-event 
window based on the Size/BM classification portfolio. The significant levels are representing by: * for 
10%, ** representing 5% and *** denotes for 1% under T1 Standardized Residual Test. If the values are 
in grey shaded then is either T2: Rank Test or T3 Generalized Sign Test, supporting the rejection. Every 
size/ proxy portfolio can be consulted in Appendix E 
Table 14b - Robustness Check: EAAR portfolios using EP as a proxy – Size Effect 
 
Note: The values are represented in CAAR-values for each corresponding event window and post-event 
window based on the Size/BM classification portfolio. The significant levels are representing by: * for 
10%, ** representing 5% and *** denotes for 1% under T1 Standardized Residual Test. If the values are 
Size_rank EP_rank obs MV (M £) EP EAAR (%) 1mth (%) 3mth (%) 6mth (%) 9mth (%) 1yr (%)
Small Glamour 1 28 204 -0.50 6.89*** 4.23 5.16 4.17 -2.97 -8.29
Small Value 5 51 830 0.18 5.54*** -0.89 -1.46 5.15 6.9 17.41**
Spread -1.35 -5.12 -6.62 0.98 9.87 25.7
Big Glamour 1 23 10657 0.03 3.77*** 1.09 0.63 -0.4 1.42 -0.84
Big Value 5 23 35883 0.15 3.03*** 0.34 1.7 2.14 2.57 2.6
Spread -0.74 -0.75 1.07 2.54 1.15 3.44
Small Glamour 1 141 181 -0.40 -8.89*** -5.32** -12.74*** -24.28*** -36.72*** -41.56***
Small Value 5 257 360 0.20 -7.06*** -1.64*** -8.29*** -9.48*** -12.72** -17.49***
Spread 1.83 3.68 4.45 14.8 24 24.07
Big Glamour 1 70 7976 0.02 -4.58*** -1.74* -6.39** -11.56** -13.13** -13.22*
Big Value 5 127 35609 0.12 -3.39*** -0.71* -2.87*** -3.27** -6.84*** -8.31***
Spread 1.19 1.03 3.52 8.29 6.29 4.91
Spread Small 14.43 4.43 11.28 29.43 43.62 58.97
Spread Big 7.61 2.08 8.09 13.7 15.7 15.82
Panel A: Earnings Surprise>0 & EAARs>0
Panel B: Earnings Surprise<0 & EAARs<0
Size_rank EP_rank obs MV (M £) EP EAAR (%) 1mth (%) 3mth (%) 6mth (%) 9mth (%) 1yr (%)
Small Glamour 1 185 146 -0.32 6.22*** 2.11* 1.65 4.79 0.54 1.54
Small Value 5 529 380 0.17 5.32*** 0.42 -0.44 0.48 -1.1 -1.29
Spread -0.9 -1.69 -2.09 -4.31 -1.64 -2.83
Big Glamour 1 151 7955 0.02 5.23*** -0.19 -0.78* 0.3 0.71 0.96
Big Value 5 190 33602 0.12 3.03*** -0.95** -0.41 -0.36 -0.47 0.56
Spread -2.2 -0.76 0.37 -0.66 -1.18 -0.4
Small Glamour 1 155 161 -0.39 -9.35*** -5.1** -14.13*** -26.54*** -40.96*** -49.71***
Small Value 5 318 371 0.21 -7.01*** -1.36*** -7.29** -8.08*** -11.35*** -14.75***
Spread 2.34 3.74 6.84 18.46 29.61 34.96
Big Glamour 1 90 7976 0.02 -4.78*** -0.64 -3.87* -7.07*** -9.84* -9.94*
Big Value 5 161 34887 0.12 -3.19*** -0.95*** -2.43*** -3.3*** -5.45** -6.54***
Spread 1.59 -0.31 1.44 3.77 4.39 3.4
Spread Small 14.67 5.52 13.69 27.02 39.86 48.42
Spread Big 7.81 -0.31 3.46 6.71 9.37 10.5
Panel A:  EAARs>0
Panel B:  EAARs<0
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in grey shaded then is either T2: Rank Test or T3 Generalized Sign Test, supporting the rejection. Every 
size/ proxy portfolio can be consulted in Appendix E 
Table 15a - Robustness Check: EAAR/ES portfolios using CP as a proxy – Size Effect 
 
Note: The values are represented in CAAR-values for each corresponding event window and post-event 
window based on the Size/BM classification portfolio. The significant levels are representing by: * for 
10%, ** representing 5% and *** denotes for 1% under T1 Standardized Residual Test. If the values are 
in grey shaded then is either T2: Rank Test or T3 Generalized Sign Test, supporting the rejection. Every 
size/ proxy portfolio can be consulted in Appendix E 
Table 15b - Robustness Check: EAAR portfolios using CP as a proxy – Size Effect 
 
Note: The values are represented in CAAR-values for each corresponding event window and post-event 
window based on the Size/BM classification portfolio. The significant levels are representing by: * for 
10%, ** representing 5% and *** denotes for 1% under T1 Standardized Residual Test. If the values are 
Size_rank CP_rank obs MV (M £) CP EAAR (%) 1mth (%) 3mth (%) 6mth (%) 9mth (%) 1yr (%)
Small Glamour 1 24 588 -0.11 5.44*** -1.07 -4.04* 0.85 -6.93* -9.96*
Small Value 5 40 647 0.41 7.09*** 2.38 5.68* 12.61** 15.59** 28.86**
Spread 1.65 3.45 9.72 11.76 22.52 38.82
Big Glamour 1 23 17761 0.01 3*** -0.57 -1.25 -2.17 -4.97 -6.96
Big Value 5 26 29049 0.16 3.87*** 0.98 5.44* 8.43** 14.63*** 18.48***
Spread 0.87 1.55 6.69 10.6 19.6 25.44
Small Glamour 1 87 359 -0.76 -8.36*** -0.45 -8.27* -11.58*** -17.03** -16.02**
Small Value 5 177 388 1.45 -6.7*** -2.38*** -11.02** -15.2*** -22.45*** -24.78**
Spread 1.66 -1.93 -2.75 -3.62 -5.42 -8.76
Big Glamour 1 70 147 0.01 -3.83*** -0.26 -2.5** -4.23*** -6.81*** -5.55***
Big Value 5 115 796 0.16 -3.91*** -1.11* -4.4*** -5.9* -7.24*** -10.59***
Spread -0.08 -0.85 -1.9 -1.67 -0.43 -5.04
Spread Small 15.45 2.83 13.95 24.19 32.62 44.88
Spread Big 7.7 1.24 7.94 12.66 21.44 24.03
Panel A: Earnings Surprise>0 & EAARs>0
Panel B: Earnings Surprise<0 & EAARs<0
Size_rank CP_rank obs MV (M £) CP EAAR (%) 1mth (%) 3mth (%) 6mth (%) 9mth (%) 1yr (%)
Small Glamour 1 111 356 -0.65 6.06*** -0.25 -1.94 -0.96 -7.02** -9.92**
Small Value 5 350 349 1.40 5.83*** 0.87 0.67 2.04 1.09 3.67
Spread -0.23 1.12 2.61 3 8.11 13.59
Big Glamour 1 151 12463 0.01 3.49*** -0.82** -1.14* -0.95 -2.71** -3.1**
Big Value 5 187 20526 0.16 3.98*** 0.27 1.56 1.08 1.73 2.95
Spread 0.49 1.09 2.7 2.03 4.44 6.05
Small Glamour 1 98 319 -0.73 -9.03*** -0.99 -10.83** -14.82*** -25.72* -30.7**
Small Value 5 226 349 1.46 -6.47*** -1.58** -8.98* -13.21*** -20.7*** -24.25***
Spread 2.56 -0.59 1.85 1.61 5.02 6.45
Big Glamour 1 90 12889 0.01 -3.81*** -0.52* -3.08*** -4.22* -6.21*** -5.42***
Big Value 5 158 21027 0.16 -3.66*** -0.89** -3.35*** -4.15* -4.92** -7.31**
Spread 0.15 -0.37 -0.27 0.07 1.29 -1.89
Spread Small 14.86 1.86 11.5 16.86 26.81 34.37
Spread Big 7.79 0.79 4.64 5.3 7.94 8.37
Panel A:  EAARs>0
Panel B:  EAARs<0
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in grey shaded then is either T2: Rank Test or T3 Generalized Sign Test, supporting the rejection. Every 
size/ proxy portfolio can be consulted in Appendix E 
Table 16a - Robustness Check: EAAR/ES portfolios using SG as a proxy – Size Effect 
 
Note: The values are represented in CAAR-values for each corresponding event window and post-event 
window based on the Size/BM classification portfolio. The significant levels are representing by: * for 
10%, ** representing 5% and *** denotes for 1% under T1 Standardized Residual Test. If the values are 
in grey shaded then is either T2: Rank Test or T3 Generalized Sign Test, supporting the rejection. Every 
size/ proxy portfolio can be consulted in Appendix E 
 
 
 
 
Size_rank SG_rank obs MV (M £) SG EAAR (%) 1mth (%) 3mth (%) 6mth (%) 9mth (%) 1yr (%)
Small Value 1 26 546 -0.47 6.07*** 0.45 -0.75* 3.6 -0.46* 4.48
Small Glamour 5 47 642 0.94 5.38*** -1.14 0.12 1.49 2.92 4.91
Spread 0.69 1.59 -0.87 2.11 -3.38 -0.43
Big Value 1 23 22147 -1.01 2.8*** 0.05 2.15 4.06 1.41 4.14
Big Glamour 5 25 11931 0.28 3.39*** 0.31 0.73 1.48 2.44 2.84
Spread -0.59 -0.26 1.42 2.58 -1.03 1.3
Small Value 1 134 379 -0.53 -6.54*** -3.68*** -9.33*** -9.84* -12.95*** -14.87***
Small Glamour 5 248 486 0.73 -5.08*** -0.92 -6.51*** -10.36*** -13.49*** -16.61***
Spread -1.46 -2.76 -2.82 0.52 0.54 1.74
Big Value 1 71 26971 -0.84 -3.2*** 0.04 -1.76* -1.81 -1.89 -3.08*
Big Glamour 5 127 13996 1.77 -3.43*** -0.29 -1.78** -2.82** -4.97*** -5.03***
Spread 0.23 0.33 0.02 1.01 3.08 1.95
Spread Small 11.15 1.37 5.76 13.96 13.03 21.09
Spread Big 6.23 0.34 3.93 6.88 6.38 9.17
Panel A: Earnings Surprise>0 & EAARs>0
Panel B: Earnings Surprise<0 & EAARs<0
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Table 16b - Robustness Check: EAAR portfolios using SG as a proxy – Size Effect 
 
Note: The values are represented in CAAR-values for each corresponding event window and post-event 
window based on the Size/BM classification portfolio. The significant levels are representing by: * for 
10%, ** representing 5% and *** denotes for 1% under T1 Standardized Residual Test. If the values are 
in grey shaded then is either T2: Rank Test or T3 Generalized Sign Test, supporting the rejection. Every 
size/ proxy portfolio can be consulted in Appendix E 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Size_rank SG_rank obs MV (M £) SG EAAR (%) 1mth (%) 3mth (%) 6mth (%) 9mth (%) 1yr (%)
Small Value 1 176 362 -0.58 5.27*** 0.48 1.97 3.31 3.79 5.82*
Small Glamour 5 492 481 0.77 4.92*** 0.76* 0.07 1.25* 0.88 0.46
Spread 0.35 -0.28 1.9 2.06 2.91 5.36
Big Value 1 156 26184 -0.81 3.4*** -0.32 -0.16 0.19 -1.42 0.96
Big Glamour 5 189 13598 1.71 3.31*** -0.51 -0.71 -0.47 -0.12 1.18
Spread 0.09 0.19 0.55 0.66 -1.3 -0.22
Small Value 1 144 365 -0.62 -6.48*** -2.92** -8.49** -8.54*** -11.61* -13.57**
Small Glamour 5 303 484 0.72 -4.87*** -0.7 -5.21*** -8.07*** -11.65*** -14.88***
Spread -1.61 -2.22 -3.28 -0.47 0.04 1.31
Big Value 1 88 26971 -0.84 -3.11*** -0.23 -2.4* -2.25 -2.18 -3.74**
Big Glamour 5 160 13865 1.78 -3.21*** -0.34** -2.07*** -2.62*** -4.99*** -5.28***
Spread 0.1 0.11 -0.33 0.37 2.81 1.54
Spread Small 10.14 1.18 7.18 11.38 15.44 20.7
Spread Big 6.61 0.02 1.91 2.81 3.57 6.24
Panel A:  EAARs>0
Panel B:  EAARs<0
